

# Research on Accountability from the Perspective of Behavioral Economics——Taking COVID-19 as an Example

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**Abstract:** *The key to China's victory in the fight against COVID-19 is the Accountability System for officials. The application of the Accountability System has effectively reduced the probability of ineffective performance of duties, neglect of supervision and oversight and dereliction of duty in epidemic prevention and control, played a role in escorting the resumption of work and production under the new normal of epidemic prevention and control. From the perspective of behavioral economics, with the same level of accountability and incentive, the parties are more sensitive to accountability, but the effect of accountability may be temporary. Once accountability stops, the punished behavior may reappear. Incentive can reduce the intrinsic motivation of people's behavior. Accountability and incentives must be used wisely.*

**Keywords:** *COVID-19; Accountability; Incentives; Behavioral economics*

## 1. Introduction

For more than a year, COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on the lives and property of people around the world, including China. According to the latest statistics on COVID-19 released by Johns Hopkins University on January 16, 2021, the cumulative number of deaths worldwide has exceeded 2.02 million, staggering 2,000,905 cases were reached.[1] In a report released in May 2020, the Asian Development Bank predicted that the world economy would suffer a loss of 5.8 trillion to 8.8 trillion US dollars due to COVID-19, accounting for 6.4% to 9.7% of global GDP.[2] Because of different understanding of COVID-19 in the world, measures taken by governments to deal with COVID-19 are different, which leads to significant differences in the severity of COVID-19 in different countries. US President Donald Trump and his administration have increasingly marginalized the CDC, which has been unable to respond in a timely and appropriate manner to the COVID-19 outbreak. As a result, the US has the highest cumulative number of COVID-19 cases and deaths in the world. Western countries such as the UK, France and Sweden did much the same as the US, either using herd immunity or freedom as a pretext, resulting in a worldwide outbreak of COVID-19. Contrary to what the US did, Chinese government put the lives and safety of its people first from the very beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. On January 18, 2020, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a Notice on Strengthening the Leadership of the CPC and Providing Strong Political Guarantees for Winning the Battle against the epidemic [3] (hereinafter referred to as the Notice). The Notice has clearly stipulated the incentive and punishment measures: Those who have made outstanding performance in the fighting against the epidemic should be commended and boldly used. But for those who lack responsibility and drift from work style, practice fraud or even dereliction of duty in the process of dealing with the epidemic, they must be held seriously accountable to make sure that a collective defense line must be built. Facts have proved that China's prevention and control of COVID-19 is correct, Especially the "Accountability system" adopted in the prevention and control of epidemic situation has greatly reduced the probability of officials' dereliction of duty, increased the efficiency of fighting the epidemic, and made contributions to win the final victory against COVID-19.

The central argument of this paper: From the perspective of behavioral economics, when faced with equal levels of incentive and punishment, the parties are more sensitive to punishment; Although incentive has a positive effect on action, if it is not sustained, it will reduce the intrinsic motivation of actors; Punishment (Accountability) can effectively reduce or terminate the behavior of the punished

people, but this reduction or termination is temporary. Once the punishment is over, the terminated behavior will reappear. Therefore, when using the incentive and Accountability System, we should develop its strengths and avoid its weaknesses.

The structure of the paper is as follows: firstly, the relevant literature of accountability is reviewed, including the theoretical origin of Accountability and the benefits and disadvantages of the implementation of Accountability. On this basis, the assumptions of the neoclassical economic model are analyzed, and an incentive-loss aversion model from the perspective of behavioral economics is constructed, with three theorems about incentive and accountability; Then, the application conditions of COVID-19's prevention and control Accountability System are summarized into three parts, and three principles are applied to analyze the Accountability System in COVID-19's prevention and control. The last part is a summary of the whole paper.

## **2. Literature review**

"Accountability system" has a long history in China. As early as the Eastern Han Dynasty, Ban Gu, a famous historian and writer, wrote in his book of Han Dynasty biography of Zhang Chang that "Zhang Chang is sensitive to people, and strict referring to the rules for reward and punishment. When he sees the wicked doing evil, he arrests them at once. He is often extra-judicial to some petty criminals." "Reward" in "keeping strictly the rules for reward and punishment" here means "incentive", while "punishment" includes the meaning of "accountability".

### **2.1. Theoretical origin of accountability system**

In the west, the principle of power and the principle of power division have always been considered to be opposite. John Locke put forward some suggestions to curb tyranny in his immortal masterpiece *Two Treatises of Civil Government*. In Locke's view, only by implementing the principle of decentralization of authority within the government can the welfare of the people be guaranteed. Therefore, Locke divided the state power into three forms: legislative power, executive power, and external power, and insisted that the legislative power and executive power must be implemented separately by different departments. Among them, the legislative power is the highest power, which plays a role in supervising and controlling the executive power and external power. If the legislative power and executive power are undertaken by the same group of people in the government, the government plays the role of both athletes and referees. When they formulate and implement the law, they will naturally make the law tend to their own private interests, so that they cannot truly realize the equality of everyone before the law.[4]

Montesquieu's idea on decentralization in *The Spirit of Law* has always been regarded as an important aspect of the source of Accountability Theory. Based on Locke's legislative power, executive power and external power, Montesquieu put forward the idea of "separation of powers" that state power is composed of legislative power, judicial power and executive power. He holds the view that "all people with power are easy to abuse power, which is an immutable experience." [5] So Montesquieu proposed that to prevent the rulers from abusing power and to avoid absolute power leading to absolute corruption, we must make power restrict each other. Specifically, the legislative power, executive power and judicial power are given to different state organs respectively. These different state organs adjust and cooperate with each other, restrict, and supervise each other.

Rousseau's contribution to the Theory of Accountability comes from his immortal book *"The Social Contract"*. Rousseau believes that the government (or the sovereign state) obtains the ruling legitimacy from the power freely handed over by the ruler in the social contract. In the social contract, the government is elected by the people, representing the general will. The social contract depends on the understanding of mutual recognition between the state and citizens.

In short, whether Montesquieu's thought of decentralization, Locke's proposal to curb tyranny, or Rousseau's theory that the government must rely on social contract, they all acknowledge the truth of power driven described by Machiavelli and they all worried about the danger of power concentration. Everyone of them suggests checks and balances in the government system in their own way, and they may be the first to clearly express their concern about Power Accountability in the history of European Enlightenment.

### ***2.2. Advantages of accountability implementation***

G. Shabbir Cheema of Institutional Development Group, Under Development Policy Bureau believes that Accountability, as a pillar of democracy and good governance, helps to combat corruption and forces the state, private institutions, and civil society to pay more attention to the effect of policy implementation, and then enables individuals and organizations to treat each work indicators as objectively and correctly as possible. For this purpose, they must set clear goals and give full play to the role of strategies, and effectively supervise and timely report the implementation.[6] G. Shabbir Cheema further divide accountability into three different forms: financial accountability, political accountability, and management accountability.

Although in a democratic society, the formulation and implementation of public decision-making should reflect the wishes of the public, this does not mean that decision-making must be made by the public directly. On the contrary, decision-making is often made by agents elected by the public. Generally speaking, agents are composed of experts in public policy. According to Adam Smith's labor division theory, these experts are much more efficient (including professionalism and skills) in decision-making than the public. However, because the agents composed of these experts also meet the hypothesis of "economic man", then, these agents also tend to obtain their own maximum economic benefits at the least cost. Some agents (such as government officials) hope to "go down in history" and long for a good reputation to be remembered by the world. Driven by this motivation, some agents can do something good for the public. However, this practice of relying only on consciousness and lack of institutional constraints is unsustainable for most agents. One of the best measures to make all agents benefit the public as principal is to implement "Accountability" for agents. The reason why the "Accountability System" can fully play its role is that government officials as agents are not only interested in "going down in history", but also interested in the pleasure brought by the privileges enjoyed by officials when they are in office. Dr. Eric Maskin, the winner of the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics argues that the "Accountability System" provides the following two benefits for clients (mainly voters with the right to vote in a democratic society): First, the "Accountability System" helps to change the ruling mode of officials (agents), so that officials can not only do things to improve their own interests, but also do things that are really beneficial to the public; Second, under the Accountability System, officials can only be re-elected through elections. Those civil servants who cannot work for the public will not be able to gain the support of voters, and only those officials who are consistent with the public will able to be re-elected.[7]

### ***2.3. Disadvantages of accountability implementation***

According to Eric Maskin, on the one hand, Accountability system helps to encourage civil servants to seek welfare for the public, but on the other hand, Accountability system also has its own disadvantages. First, government officials also meet the "economic man" hypothesis and hope to win the election to maximize their own interests. Under the circumstances, an official is likely to hide his real motivation, go against his own ideas, deliberately cater to some common ideas of the public, and then achieve his goal of winning the election. However, this action of government officials is incorrect. The reason why the public vote for a candidate is that they believe that the candidate has stronger ability than the public. If the candidate simply blindly follows the public's opinions and ideas in order to maximize his utility without considering whether they are reasonable or not, then the ideas of these candidates (actually experts in some field) will lose the value and significance of their continued existence. So, it is obviously wrong to cater to the public. Secondly, the implementation of Accountability tends to overemphasize the interests of the majority of people, while to ignore the interests of some groups representing the minority. Under the Accountability System, to achieve the goal of re-election, civil servants often have to make a choice between the group interests representing the majority and the group interests representing the minority. In fact, this choice strengthens the power of the group representing the majority and ignores the power of the group representing the minority. For a society, we should pay more attention to the improvement of the utility of the minority who are in a relatively weak position, rather than focusing on the improvement of the utility of the majority who are already in a relatively strong position. In this sense, there are drawbacks in the Accountability system. Finally, under the Accountability System, if a government official realizes that he cannot be re-elected for some reason (such as retirement age, public praise, political achievements, etc.), he is likely to completely ignore the existence of the Accountability System and act according to his intention, in this case, Accountability exists in name only.

### 3. Model analysis

#### 3.1. Model analysis of neoclassical economics

According to the mainstream economics represented by neoclassical economics, consumers are considered to meet the "economic man" hypothesis (also known as the "rational man" hypothesis). In addition to being concerned about their own interests, they seem to be omnipotent: Fully understanding their living environment, having the preference of completeness and transitivity, the cognitive ability to make optimal choices and the ability to execute those preferences perfectly.

Under the condition that the rational man hypothesis is satisfied, the Consumer choice model holds that the utility that a consumer increases after obtaining goods is the same as the utility that consumers lose after reducing the same number of goods.

Suppose a consumer consumes two kinds of goods 1 and 2, in which the quantities of goods 1 and 2 are  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  respectively. If at the beginning, the consumer does not consume goods 1, that is,  $x_1 = 0$ , but only consumes goods 2, then his utility can be expressed as  $u(0, x_2)$ . If the consumer increases the consumption of commodity 1 by  $x_1$ , the utility increase of the consumer will be  $\Delta u_g = u(x_1, x_2) - u(0, x_2)$ . If all the goods 1 are taken away later, then the consumer loses utility of  $\Delta u_l = u(x_1, x_2) - u(0, x_2)$ . Obviously,  $\Delta u_g = \Delta u_l$ , which indicates that the consumer still obtains the initial utility level  $u(0, x_2)$ . In other words, the utility to consumers of acquiring goods is equal to the pain to consumers of losing the same quantity of goods.

In real society, people are flesh and blood and full of emotion. When they act, they will be affected by emotion, atmosphere, society, history, culture, and other internal and external factors. But mainstream economics regards these as insignificant minor details and abandons them. For example, a famous hypothesis in mainstream economics about consumer preference is that preference has transitive characteristics, but psychological research shows that human behavior only basically, not completely, meets the transitivity axiom of preference. A researcher conducted such an experiment, asking people to compare ten items of equal value one on one. The experimental results find that adults and children aged 9-12 have great differences in preference transitivity. Among them, 94% of adults meet preference transitivity, while only 79% of children aged 9-12 meet preference transitivity.[8] This shows that the rational hypothesis of mainstream economics represented by neoclassical economics is wrong. According to mainstream economics, "economic man" is a Superman with entirely rational, absolute self-interest and omnipotence, which extremely deviates from the real situation of the world.

Based on the above reasons, by the middle of the 20th century, many economists had found the limitations of neoclassical economics and realized the important role of psychological factors in decision-making. In fact, economics has never denied that psychological factors are an important aspect affecting people's decision-making. Adam Smith, the founder of classical economics, who once discussed the psychological principles of behavior in detail in his book *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, for example, believes that if a person drops from a better condition to a worse condition, the pain he feels will be much stronger than the happiness that this person can feel when he rises from a worse situation to a better situation.[9] Adam Smith's view is actually a specific performance of the "loss aversion" of later behavioral economics. Jeremy Bentham, the founder of British utilitarianism, once pointed out that psychology plays a pillar role in utility. In principle, everyone is the best judge of his own happiness.[10] According to Samuelson's happiness equation ( $happiness = \frac{utility}{desire}$ ), both utility and desire are closely related to people's psychological feelings, and different people's feelings of happiness are inconsistent. In his book *Mathematical Psychology*, Francis Edgeworth introduced the reward of others into the individual utility function to illustrate the social impact of decision-making; In addition, Edgeworth also raised an objection to the traditional theory of cardinal utility, holding that utility is a psychological feeling of people, and the size of utility cannot be measured, but it can be ranked.[11]

Herbert Simon, the winner of the Nobel Prize in economics in 1978, believes that people's ability to deal with information and solve problems is not omnipotent as assumed by "rational people", but bounded rationality. Specifically, it is "unable to know all options, uncertain about exogenous events, and unable to calculate the consequences".[12] In 1979, behavioral economists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky found that the pain of people losing something is much stronger than the happiness of getting the same thing.[13] According to Kahneman and Tversky, any event brings either benefit or loss: the utility function of benefit is  $u_g(x)$ , which satisfies the law of diminishing marginal utility, and the benefit utility function is a concave function. The utility function of loss is  $u_l(x)$ , which is a function of increasing

marginal utility and a convex function. The graphs of utility function  $u_g(x)$  and  $u_l(x)$  are shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Graph of benefit utility function and loss utility function.

### 3.2. Incentive-loss aversion model

The rational "economic man" hypothesis of mainstream economics cannot achieve the compatibility of efficiency and fairness. To maximize his own interests, "economic man" will sacrifice fairness. Behavioral economists Fehr Ernst and Klaus M. Schmidt believes that people will pay attention to fairness in some cases, while in other cases, they show a strong interest in maximizing their own interests but turn a blind eye to fairness. On this basis, Fehr and Schmidt put forward a model to explain the behavior of fairness and self-interest. The assumptions of the model are the same as those of mainstream economics, which are rational assumptions, but it unifies the two contradictory behavior modes of fairness and self-interest into a utility function.[14] Then, based on fair-self-interest behavior model of Fehr and Schmidt, an incentive-loss aversion model is constructed.

The assumptions of the model still meet the rational man hypothesis, that is, the completeness, transitivity, and reflexivity of preferences. Under this assumption, there is a utility function. The specific utility function is:

$$U(x_t) = x_0 + \alpha \text{Max}\{x_t - x_0, 0\} - \beta \text{Max}\{x_0 - x_t, 0\} \quad (1)$$

Among them,  $U(x_t)$  is someone's utility,  $x_0$  is someone's current monetary income,  $x_t$  is someone's monetary income in phase t, in addition,  $0 < \alpha \leq \beta$ .

If  $x_t > x_0$ , it means that the income in phase t is greater than that in the current period, and the person is encouraged. Under this condition, equation (1) becomes to equation (2):

$$U(x_t) = x_0 + \alpha(x_t - x_0) \quad (2)$$

And if  $x_t < x_0$ , it indicates that the income in phase t is less than that in the current period, under this condition, the person has been punished(accountable), and the equation (1) becomes to equation (3):

$$U(x_t) = x_0 - \beta(x_0 - x_t) \quad (3)$$

According to equation (2) and equation (3), the increased utility when encouraged is less than the reduced utility when held accountable, that is, if the same incentive and punishment (Accountability) are applied, the parties are more sensitive to punishment. However, it must be noted that for the deterrent effect of punishment, although almost no one will deny the role of punishment, there has always been a dispute between positive and negative aspects, and the focus of the dispute is on the size of the deterrent effect and best kind of punishment.[15] This is actually a discussion about whether the best deterrent

exists. Sunstein Cass R, Schkade David and Daniel Kahneman conducted two studies to verify whether people believe in the best Deterrence: the first study provided people with the same personal injury cases except for different detection probabilities. On this basis, they discussed whether cases with low probability of occurrence would produce higher punitive damages, and whether the cases with higher probability of occurrence will produce lower compensation. But the research did not get the desired results; The second study asked people whether they approve or disapprove of such administrative and judicial policies. When the probability of discovery of administrative and judicial policies is low, the punishment is increased, and when the probability of discovery is high, the punishment is reduced. But the results show that the vast majority of people reject such judicial and administrative policies.[16] Although there is no best deterrent force of punishment, punishment can indeed reduce the probability of punished behavior. After being punished, the punished behavior of the parties will be reduced or terminated, but this reduction or termination is temporary. When the punishment (such as accountability) is over, the terminated behavior will reappear.[17]

In addition, people have been paying attention to the impact of incentive on behavior. For a long time, mainstream economics represented by neoclassical economics and behaviorist psychology have always insisted that incentive will have a positive effect on action. In their view, if the action itself is neutral, stimulating the action will give the action positive value [18]. But after the 1970s, Cognitive psychology has questioned this view of behaviorist psychology. Cognitive psychology believes that action itself has an intrinsic motivation, that is to say, all actions themselves have an incentive effect independent of any reward and incentive reduces intrinsic motivation. However, it must be noted that there are exceptions to the case of incentive reducing intrinsic motivation. Someone has done a three-stage experiment for this purpose: in the first stage, there is no reward; In the second stage, rewards were set up; In the third stage, the reward has been cancelled. The study found that in the first stage, because there is no reward, the behavior itself is completely out of intrinsic motivation; In the second stage, due to the setting of rewards, incentives do not reduce the intrinsic motivation of actors; In the third stage, due to the cancellation of the reward, the intrinsic motivation of the actor decreases with the cancellation of the reward, and does not return to the state in which no reward is set in the first stage[18], which reminds us that in the case of unsustainable incentive, if we unilaterally emphasize the role of incentive and once the incentive disappears, the intrinsic motivation of actors may also be reduced. Therefore, before incentive, we need to measure the loss caused by the reduction of the intrinsic motivation of the actor after the incentive disappears.

Therefore, based on the above model analysis and existing research, we get the relevant theorems about incentive and punishment (accountability) as follows:

Theorem 1: Punishment (accountability) can effectively reduce or terminate the behavior of the punished person; However, this reduction or termination is temporary. Once the punishment is over, the terminated behavior will reappear.

Theorem 2: Although incentive can have a positive effect on action, if incentive is not sustained, it will reduce the intrinsic motivation of actors.

Theorem 3: With the same incentive and punishment (accountability), the parties are more sensitive to punishment.

#### **4. Application of accountability system in COVID-19's prevention and control**

The Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Commission for discipline inspection required that the sharp tools of accountability must be accurately and regularly used, and those who failed to promote the major decision-making and deployment of overall epidemic prevention and control must be seriously held accountable. According to the information released by the website of the Communist Party of China Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission, the accountability of the discipline inspection and supervision organs increased nationwide in 2020. A total of 7292 Party organization and 86 thousand party members were held accountable. Among them, the number of accountable cases caused by the failure to fight COVID-19 and the resumption of work and production accounted for a large proportion, in the first half of 2020. In Wuhan alone, 2756 people were held accountable by Discipline Inspection and supervision organs and a total of 313 people were filed for investigation. And Hubei province held 14534 cases of dereliction of duty and violation of discipline in the prevention and control of COVID-19 accountable in which 15509 people were punished.[19] Facts have proved that the Accountability System has played a powerful role in compacting responsibility and promoting implementation in the process of fighting COVID-19.

Based on the national case in fighting COVID-19, the main reasons for being held accountable include the following three aspects:

First, there are some problems in the prevention and control of epidemic situation, such as poor performance, loss of supervision and dereliction of duty. This is also the main reason for being held accountable in COVID-19's prevention and control. According to theorem 1, Accountability can effectively reduce or terminate the behavior of the punished person. At the beginning of covid-19 outbreak, due to the lack of knowledge about COVID-19, leaders of some local functional departments are lax, ineffective in performing their duties, leading to negligent supervision, and oversight, or even dereliction of duty. In this grim situation, discipline inspection and supervision organs have carried out precise and effective accountability in an effective manner, effectively reducing the probability of misconduct, oversight, and dereliction of duty, and provided a guarantee for winning the battle against COVID-19. This example is most representative of the most serious epidemic situation in Wuhan and Wangkui County in Heilongjiang in 2021. On the early days of the outbreak, the situation of COVID-19 in Wuhan was extremely serious. For this reason, Wuhan municipal leaders asked the district heads and the district party secretaries of all districts of Wuhan to sign the responsibility statement reminding that they will be held accountable for any omissions.[20] In December 2020, Huiqi Town, Wangkui County, Heilongjiang Province, due to dereliction of duty and responsibility, due to the negligence of local officials, took on the emergence of a cluster epidemic with long hidden transmission time and wide external spread. In order To prevent similar phenomena from happening again, 16 party members, cadres and public officials were resolutely held accountable, so that the epidemic in Wangkui county was quickly and effectively controlled.[21] After the appearance of COVID-19, Wuhan was the first to carry out accountability for the lack of epidemic prevention and control, and many parts of the country also held those relevant people accountable for the lack of effective epidemic prevention and control.

Second, to intervene in the overall situation of epidemic prevention and destroy the discipline of epidemic prevention and control is the second reason for being held accountable. The cases in this regard are represented by the "mask storm" in Dali, Yunnan Province. At the critical moment of the whole nation's fight against COVID-19, the illegal seizure of Chongqing epidemic prevention masks passing through Dali, Yunnan province, has seriously interfered with the overall situation of national epidemic prevention work, seriously damaged the discipline of epidemic prevention work, and caused a bad influence in the whole country. Therefore, in order to solve the problem of COVID-19, The supervision committee of Yunnan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection held eight responsible persons and five units accountable, including the Secretary of Dali municipal Party committee and the mayor.[22] In addition, it must be noted that Yang Jian, deputy secretary of Dali State Party committee and governor, who was admonished and held accountable in the "mask storm" in Dali, Yunnan Province, was admonished and held accountable on December 24, 2019 for the environmental problems of Erhai Lake. That is to say, Yang Jian was held accountable twice as governor of Dali state in two months from December 2019 to February 2020, which also shows the correctness of Theorem 1 that the reduction of punished behavior caused by accountability may be temporary. Once the accountability is completed, the terminated behavior may occur again.

Third, the failure to take responsibility for resumption of work and production in the epidemic prevention and control is also an important reason for being held accountable.

In the normalization process of COVID-19's prevention and control, on the one hand, we must do a good job in epidemic prevention and control, and on the other hand, we must also promote the resumption of work and production in an orderly and effective way, which is also an important guarantee for winning the battle against epidemic prevention and control. Taking Tianjin as an example, in May 2020, the supervision committee of Tianjin Municipal Commission for discipline inspection organized eight supervision and inspection teams to carry out special supervision and inspection to effectively promote the implementation of various policies on resumption of work and production issued by the municipal government. The joint supervision and inspection team found that the leaders of Hongqiao District Market Supervision Bureau failed to implement the resumption of work and production, and there were problems of nonresponsibility and inaction, The supervision committee of Hongqiao District Commission for Discipline Inspection seriously held the main principals of Hongqiao District Market Supervision Bureau accountable, and the director and deputy director in charge of the market supervision bureau were dismissed.[23]

## 5. Conclusions

The Accountability System played an important role in the process of fighting COVID-19, The precise and effective Accountability System effectively reduced the occurrence of ineffective performance, loss of supervision, negligence, and dereliction of duty in epidemic prevention and control, and played an important role in escorting the resumption of work and production under the normal situation of epidemic prevention and control. However, we should also recognize that when faced with the same level of incentive and punishment, the parties are more sensitive to punishment. Once the punishment is over, the terminated behavior may occur again, which reminds us that we should not take Accountability as the only method in epidemic prevention and control, and it should be supplemented by appropriate incentive measures, which plays an important role in epidemic prevention and control, which is why the rapid promotion of officials and the rapid recruitment of Party members have been seen across the country in the fight against COVID-19. However, how to make good use of motivation to make it really play a positive role without reducing the intrinsic motivation of actors due to unsustainable motivation is a problem we need to face. In our socialist country led by the Communist Party, serving the people wholeheartedly should be the fundamental purpose of every Communist Party member and the internal motivation of every Communist Party member's behavior. We must not reduce the internal motivation of every Communist Party member to serve the people wholeheartedly due to unsustainable incentives.

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