

Study on the influence of government background customers on the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure

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Abstract: High-quality development is the primary task of building a modern socialist country in an all-round way. The quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure affects the quality of market information and then affects the quality of market economy. Based on the customer information data of listed companies in China from 2011 to 2020, the influence of customers with government background on the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure is explored. The results show that government background customers help to improve the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure. The higher the concentration of government background customers, the better the stability, and the better it is to the improvement of the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure. Further inspection also found that in the enterprises with standard opinions and great competition in the industry, the government background customers can better promote the improvement of the quality of accounting information disclosure of enterprises.

Keywords: government background customer; quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure; customer concentration; customer stability

1. Introduction

The report points out that high-quality development is the primary task for building a modern socialist country in an all-round way. And the quality of market information affects the quality of market economy. The quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure has always been the focus of all stakeholders. In recent years, Kangmei Pharmaceutical and other listed companies have made up for the gap between their actual performance and investors' expectations by whitewash financial statements, deceiving the public, which has seriously affected the institutional construction of the capital market and dampened investor confidence. Improving the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure is of great significance for promoting the stable, long-term and high-quality development of enterprises and standardizing the order of market economy.

Government procurement has always been one of the important means of support, which is mainly used for infrastructure construction, and has a certain policy guidance. Compared with the government subsidy, a support means to temporarily alleviate the "urgent need" of enterprises, participating in the transaction activities of enterprises as a big customer can bring more "living water" value to the enterprise and alleviate the experience difficulties of enterprises^[1]. The rapid expansion of the scale of government procurement investment in recent years shows that the government increasingly relies on this behavior of participating in the market economy activities in the role of customers for the macro-control of the market economy. Therefore, it is worth discussing whether government-background customers will improve the quality of enterprise information disclosure as expected.

Therefore, based on the influence of government background customers on the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure, the top five customer information disclosed by China's listed companies from 2011 to 2020 are manually found that the government background customers help to improve the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure; the more concentrated and stable customers of government background, the more helpful to improve the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure. Further inspection also found that these phenomena were more obvious in the enterprises with standard opinions. The study helps to find the customer structure on the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure, research contribution mainly reflected in: (1) the

government to customer role and enterprise economic activity is a kind of meet the demand of products and macroeconomic regulation and control of purchasing quality, from the perspective of customers to expand how to improve the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure research perspective.(2) identify the difference between the influence of government background customers on the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure from the concentration and stability of government background customers.

2. Literature review and research hypotheses

2.1. Quality of accounting information disclosure of government-background customers and enterprises

Government-background customers are different from traditional big customers, who do not aim for profit, combine with policy orientation, and have certain support and supervision motivation. First of all, customers with government background have good commercial credit and high quality, and the order amount is generally larger than that of private enterprises. Therefore, it can promote the performance growth and profit quality of enterprises, reduce operational risks, and then make enterprises more willing to disclose real information to the outside world. Secondly, based on the signal transmission theory, the government background customer high reputation, the enterprise has the government background customer, to the investors, creditors and good quality signal, then improve the enterprise income, increase the cash flow, effectively alleviate the financing constraints of the enterprise (Cohen et al., 2021) [2], and reduce the management to manipulate the information for capital problems; meanwhile, the government background customer has a strong supervision effect on the enterprise behavior, if the government finds the violations of the enterprise, the enterprise will suffer more losses than the general customer after the discovery. For example, government-background customers will cooperate with the tax bureau and other units to thoroughly investigate the accounts of enterprises, and make severe penalties such as litigation, fines, and suspension of business for rectification. This punishment information will make the stakeholders and the public have a negative impression on the enterprise and aggravate the loss of the enterprise. To avoid risks, enterprises will regulate their own behavior, choose to reduce the occurrence of violations, strengthen internal control, create a healthy business environment, and provide real and reliable information to the outside. As a third-party auditor, auditors bear part of the risks of the enterprise and also accept the supervision of customers with government background. If the audit fails, their reputation loss will be magnified. Under the pressure of reputation, auditors will be more careful in implementing audit procedures to reduce audit risks (Dou C et al., 2020b) [3] to improve the quality of information disclosed by enterprises. In addition, the government units have high standards for the products purchased. In order to retain the customers with spillover effect, enterprises are willing to improve product quality, constantly innovate, reduce operational risks, reduce earnings management, and then improve the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure. In conclusion, the following hypotheses H1 can be proposed:

H1: Government background customers can improve the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure.

2.2. The concentration degree of government-background customer procurement and the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure

Competition between customers and suppliers causes "value plunder"; the other is cooperation to promotes "value creation" (Li H et al., 2019) [4]. We think the influence of government background customers on enterprises is more to promote the creation of enterprise value. first, Government-background clients will never go bankrupt, Funds come from fiscal revenue, There are no financial constraints, and there is good business credit, There is no motivation to encroach on the interests of suppliers through price reduction or commercial credit; next, Government units have high standards for the products purchased, Specifically in the quality requirements of products and the reputation of the enterprise, In addition, the government has natural authority and high attention in the market (Banerjee, etc., 2008)[5]. If a customer relationship breaks down due to a negative scandal, more serious economic consequences than those of the average customer. Therefore, the asymmetric dependence between enterprises and government background customers can promote enterprises to pay attention to product quality and innovation, improve the reputation and the quality of corporate accounting information disclosure, To reduce the management crisis; in addition, the government-background customers

make the economies behavior with enterprises, in addition to meeting the needs of goods and services, there are also certain policy guidance and support role (Bai ZY, etc., 2016)^[6], promote enterprises to gain a foothold in the market, which is inconsistent with the purpose of non-government units. Therefore, the concentration of government background customers will not cause "value plunder" to enterprises, cause operational risks, reduce the motivation of earnings management, financial fraud or artificial manipulation, and improve the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure. In conclusion, the following assumptions can be proposed:

H2: The higher the customer concentration of government background, the better the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure.

2.3. The stability of government-background customers and the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure

Stable customer relationship can provide enterprises with a stable environment, reduce rent-seeking costs. Enterprises also do not need to consider the impact of customer loss, through establishing strategic cooperation with partners and in-depth communication, mutual trust, long-term contract, reduce the cost of contract program against market risk, improve enterprise core competitiveness, effectively reduce the enterprise caused by insufficient information sharing between the "cow whip effect". First of all, based on the signal transmission theory, the stable customer relationship sends out the signal of smooth operation and profit to the outside world (Wang XY et al., 2017b)^[7]. Many investors or creditors in considering whether to economic activities with enterprises, will consider whether the top five customers to change frequently, investors think enterprises' which change big customers frequently economic state is not stable, and stable government background customers effectively illustrates the enterprise healthy business environment, compared with the unstable big customers, investors tend to invest with stable big customers, this can enterprise cash flow increase, alleviate the enterprise financing constraints, reduce management manipulation, enterprise accounting information disclosure quality improved. Secondly, the current securities market has not reached the standard of semi-strong effective market (Liu J et al., 2018)^[8]. In order to meet investors' expectations, enterprises will use asymmetric information to disclose untrue information and reduce the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure, so as to release a good signal to the market. Government background customers have a natural supervisory role, have a strong reputation guarantee and strength certification, can alleviate the degree of market information asymmetry, and improve the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure. In addition, gosman et al. (2004)^[9] also found that big customers contribute to the profitability of enterprises. The depth of cooperation between enterprises and the upstream and downstream can improve the performance of the enterprise. The deeper the cooperation, the higher the joint value creation level of the two companies, and the more the enterprise performance will be promoted. The most direct way to strengthen this depth is to establish a stable relationship with big customers. Enterprises with good performance are willing to disclose more information, and the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure is improved. In conclusion, the following assumptions can be proposed:

H3: The better the stability of government-background customers, the better the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure.

3. Research design

3.1. Sample selection and data source

The original data of the government background customer data comes from the top five customer information of listed companies in Guotaian (CSMAR) database and combined with the national enterprise credit information publicity system, the enterprise property right information, the actual controller information and the shareholder investment information, to accurately determine whether the company customers have the government background. Due to the lack of mandatory requirements for the disclosure of the top five customer information, the few active disclosure of the top five customer information, and the rapid changes in China's economic environment, the data before 2011 are outdated and lack of comparability, so the data of listed companies in 2011-2020 are selected for research. Other data were obtained from Guotaian database. In order to ensure the reliability of conclusions and data integrity, the following treatments were made: (1) excluding delisted, ST or * ST companies to avoid the impact caused by abnormal financial condition of the enterprise; (2) excluding sample enterprises

with missing data; (3) to avoid the influence of extreme values, all continuous variables were reduced by 1%. After the above screening, 633 listed companies' samples, a total of 2 656 companies-annual observations.

3.2. Variable definition

3.2.1. Government background customer (Gov 1)

Referring to the practice of Cohen et al. (2020)^[9] and Dou C et al. (2020)^[1], the major government key customers are identified based on the specific names of the top five customers voluntarily disclosed by China's listed companies.

3.2.2. Government background Customer Concentration (Gov 2)

Referring to the method of Wang XY (2014)^[10] to measure the customer concentration degree of government background (gov2), that is, the proportion of the operating revenue of government background customers in the total operating revenue among the top five customers.

3.2.3. Government background customer stability (Govbalance)

Using the method of Jin J et al. (2021)^[11] in defining customer stability, using whether the top five customers showed customer stability in the previous year. If the top five customers appear at least two times in the current year and in the past year, the customer relationship is stable as 1, otherwise the customer relationship is unstable as 0.

3.2.4. Quality of enterprise accounting Information disclosure (Quality)

Based on the measurement method of Sun CG et al. (2017)^[12] and Yang HY et al. (2012)^[13], the quality of enterprise information disclosure is measured according to the evaluation grade of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, with excellent, good, passing and failing being 1,2,3 and 4 respectively. The transparency of information disclosure adopts the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Information Disclosure evaluation (Quality) to express the overall quality of disclosure.

3.2.5. Other main variables are as shown in Table 1

Table 1: List of variable definitions and measures

Type of variable	sign	Variable name	definition
definition	Quality	Listed companies' disclosure evaluation scores	According to the evaluation level of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the quality of accounting information disclosure is measured, with excellent, good, passing and failing counting 1,2,3 and 4 respectively.
explanatory variable	Gov1	Big government customers	dumb variable. Whether the first five customers in the t-period have government departments (party, government, military departments and government institutions at all levels) and state-owned enterprises, it is 1, otherwise it is 0.
	Gov2	Concentration of big government customers	In period t, the proportion of sales of government departments (party, government, military departments and government institutions) and state-owned enterprises in the total sales of enterprises
	Govbalance	Stability of key government customers	The top five customers appeared at least twice in the current year and in the past year for a stable customer relationship, otherwise the customer relationship is unstable.
Group variable	Edit	audit opinion	The third party accounting firm of the company issues a standard for the company is 1, otherwise it is 0.
	HHI	Industry concentration	The smaller the Hindex, the smaller the value, the greater the competition in the industry
controlled variable	Size	company size	Natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of period t.
	Growth	increase rate of business revenue	(Phase t-t-1 operating income) / t-1 operating income.
	Lev	asset-liability ratio	Total liabilities at the end of phase t / Total assets at the end of t
	Roa	all capital earnings rate	Net profit amount / total assets.
	Inst	Share-holding ratio of institutional investors	Share ratio of institutional investors at the end of period t.
	Mshare	Management shareholding	Shareratio of the company's management at the end of period t.
	Risk	financial leverage	(Net profit + income tax expense + financial expenses) / (net profit + income tax expense)
	Cft	Operating cash flow	Net cash flow of operating activities in year t / total assets in year t.
	Occupy	Capital funds occupied by major shareholders	Total assets at the end of period t.

3.3. Model setting

$$\text{Quality}_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Gov1}_{i,t} + \sum(\alpha_{j,t} \times \text{Control}_{j,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Quality}_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Gov2}_{i,t} + \sum(\alpha_{j,t} \times \text{Control}_{j,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Quality}_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Govbalance}_{i,t} + \sum(\alpha_{j,t} \times \text{Control}_{j,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (3)$$

In the above model, Quality is the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure, ε is the random error term, and Control is the control variable, including all the aforementioned tax avoidance control variables. The specific definition is the same as shown in Table 1. If the empirical results of model (1) (2) (3) of government background customer (Gov 1), government background customer concentration (Gov2), and government background customer stability (Govbalance) regression coefficient are negative and can pass the significance test, then H1, H2 and H3 are confirmed. That is, government background customers can promote the improvement of the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure, and the higher the concentration of government background customers, the better the stability, the more conducive to the improvement of the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure.

4. Analysis of the empirical results

4.1. Descriptive statistics

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the study variables. From the selected samples, it can be found that the minimum and maximum values of the information quality score of the selected listed companies are 1.000 and 4.000, and the average value is 1.98, close to 2, indicating that the quality of the selected samples is uniform. In the active disclosure of customer information of listed companies, 53.1% of the enterprises have government background, and more than 38% of the government background customers still exist in 2 years, the government and related departments as enterprise customers is more common, and generally has a relatively stable relationship, also indirectly reflects the government procurement behavior have support enterprise motivation. However, the minimum proportion of operating income of government-background customers is 0, and the maximum value is 97.3%, which indicates that in the sample, different enterprises or enterprises sell to the government, which can more reflect the impact of government-background customers on the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure. At the same time, in the sample, the average proportion of government background departments accounted for more than 12% of the operating income of listed companies, indicating that customers with government background occupy an important position in enterprises, and different forms of customer structures may affect the business activities of enterprises. Values of the other control variables were within reasonable intervals.

Table 2: Statistical results of the sample by descriptive analysis

	N	min	max	average	median	sd
Quality	2656	1.000	4.000	1.980	2.000	0.545
Gov1	2656	0.000	1.000	0.531	1.000	0.499
Gov2	2656	0.000	0.973	0.121	0.011	0.224
Govbalance	2656	0.000	1.000	0.388	0.000	0.487
Edit	2656	0.000	1.000	0.977	1.000	0.150
HHI	2656	0.015	1.000	0.260	0.193	0.241
Size	2656	19.299	25.765	22.427	22.311	1.267
Growth	2656	-0.562	2.473	0.150	0.079	0.402
Lev	2656	0.068	0.917	0.472	0.478	0.201
Roa	2656	-0.053	0.199	0.042	0.032	0.039
Mshare	2656	0.000	0.579	0.067	0.000	0.142
Risk	2656	0.000	9.131	1.607	1.175	1.361
Inst	2656	0.008	0.870	0.439	0.456	0.218
Cft	2656	-0.201	0.237	0.047	0.046	0.070
Occupy	2656	0.000	0.140	0.016	0.008	0.023

4.2. Correlation analysis

The results of the correlation analysis are shown in Table Table 3. From the correlation analysis results, the correlation coefficients of Gov 1, Gov 2, Govbalance and Quality are-0.096, -0.090 and-0.114 respectively, all of which are significantly related at the 1% level, preliminarily indicating that the concentration of government background customers and the stability of government background customers can promote the improvement of the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure. The correlation of the control variables is shown in the figure below, which is not repeated here.

Table 3: Results of the sample correlation analysis

	Quality	Gov1	Gov2	Govbalance	Edit	HHI	Size	Growth	Lev	Roa	Mshare	Risk	Inst	Cft	Occupy
Quality	1														
Gov1	-0.096***	1													
Gov2	-0.090***	0.507***	1												
Govbalance	-0.114***	0.749***	0.484***	1											
Edit	-0.212***	0.037*	0.042**	0.040**	1										
HHI	0.012	0.016	-0.038*	0.017	0.025	1									
Size	-0.174***	0.193***	0.253***	0.220***	0.089***	0.032	1								
Growth	0.013	-0.020	-0.017	-0.054***	-0.001	0.074***	-0.000	1							
Lev	0.056***	0.086***	0.117***	0.074***	-0.041**	0.110***	0.517***	0.063***	1						
Roa	-0.160***	-0.048**	-0.063***	-0.060***	0.056***	0.049**	-0.117***	0.164***	-0.358***	1					
Mshare	-0.032*	-0.000	-0.100***	-0.001	-0.006	-0.034*	-0.233***	0.069***	-0.277***	0.140***	1				
Risk	0.080***	-0.002	0.071***	-0.003	-0.059***	-0.065***	0.169***	-0.070***	0.367***	-0.331***	-0.135***	1			
Inst	-0.156***	0.041**	0.125***	0.076***	0.064***	0.017	0.397***	-0.031	0.151***	0.124***	-0.422***	-0.013	1		
Cft	-0.116***	0.013	0.072***	0.034*	0.060***	-0.028	0.041**	-0.012	-0.123***	0.393***	-0.017	-0.069***	0.127***	1	
Occupy	0.128***	0.034*	-0.085***	0.026	-0.082***	0.109***	0.006	0.057***	0.173***	-0.077***	0.011	0.024	-0.075***	-0.151***	1

Note: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; * significant at the 0.1 level.

4.3. Regression analysis

4.3.1. Quality of accounting information disclosure of government-background customers and enterprises

In order to test the influence of the relationship of government background customers (Gov1) on the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure (Quality), the model (1) was regressed in full sample and obtained the results in column (1) in Table 4. The results show that the coefficient of Gov1 is significantly negative at the level of 1%, indicating that the government background customers have a positive role in promoting the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure. Customers with government background have a certain role in supervising enterprises, and enterprises will continue to improve the quality of their own accounting information disclosure in order to retain customers with government background. The hypothesis of H1 was verified. Overall, the regression results of the control variables in the model (1) were largely as expected.

4.3.2. The concentration degree of government-background customers and the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure

In order to test the impact of the concentration of government orders on the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure, this paper calculates the proportion of the sales of large customers in the total sales, and conducts regression analysis, and obtains the results listed in (2) of Table 4. The results show that the coefficient of Gov 2 is significantly negative at the level of 5%, indicating that the more concentrated the government background customers are, the higher the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure is. Government background Customers have good credit and more customer orders, which will bring huge cash flow to enterprises and have positive income spillover effect, reduce the operating risks of enterprises, and improve the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure. The hypothesis that H2 is verified. This is inconsistent with many existing conclusions that the concentration of large customers has an inhibitory effect on the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure, which once again verifies the impact of inconsistent customer structure on the business performance of enterprises. The regression results of the control variables in the model (2) were basically as expected.

4.3.3. Stability of government-background customers and the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure

Next, this paper considers the government background customer stability for the impact of enterprise accounting information disclosure quality, the enterprise has more than two consecutive years of government background customers as a stable group, the rest as the regression analysis results, the government background customer stability (Govbalance) coefficient at 1% level significantly negative, namely the government background customer more stable, the higher the enterprise accounting information disclosure quality. And existing many about customer stability on the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure conclusion consistent, it shows that both government background customers or private enterprise customers, the stability of the big customer provides a stable cash flow, reduce the cost of communication between the supply chain, improve enterprise performance, also let enterprises to foresee the future situation, make further strategy, to improve the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure. The hypothesis that H3 is verified. The regression results of the control variables in the model (3) were basically as expected.

Table 4: Regression results

variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
Gov1	-0.063*** (-2.66)		
Gov2		-0.123** (-2.23)	
Govbalance			-0.069*** (-2.82)
Controls	YES	YES	YES
Year&Industry	YES	YES	YES
R-squared	0.138	0.138	0.139
F	6.11	6.08	6.12
N	2645	2645	2645

Note: ***, ** and * represent the significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, with the t-value adjusted (Robust), the same below.

5. Robustness test

5.1. Sample self-selection problem

Government units choose to have economic business contacts with enterprises because of the good quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure, or do the enterprises promote their information quality because of the government background customers. Therefore, there may be sample self-selection problems. To address this problem, Based on Dou Chao (2020)^[14] reverse causality test method, Take the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure as the relationship between the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure and the government background customers in the coming year, the regression results remained robust after considering the sample self-selection problem.

5.2. Endogeneity

As mentioned above, government-background customers can promote the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure of enterprises, but the disclosure of the top five customer name information is actively disclosed by enterprises, so enterprises may actively disclose the information of customers with government background in order to improve the trust of stakeholders in the enterprise. To solve the problem of this endogeneity, Financial leverage (Risk), management shareholding ratio (Mshare), asset return ratio (Roa) and other indicators are selected as matching characteristic variables, Government background customer (Gov1) as the explained variable, Regression using the samples after nuclear matching, the regression results remained robust.

5.3. Special industry factors

Considering that the economic business of government and business in some industries is services, Not for physical procurement, therefore, Excluding relatively special industries such as "electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply, as well as information transmission, software and

information technology services", Again regressing the sample, The results show that the influence effect of government background customers on the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure is stable.

6. Further analysis

In order to deeply explore the influence of government background customers and the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure, Qiu YB et al. (2020)^[15] was used to further group test the above conclusions from the perspective of supervision and competition.

6.1. Regulatory perspective

Audit opinions are an important reference for investors, supervisors and creditors to make decisions and judgments on business operation and management activities. Under the situation of strengthening supervision by the government and the CPA professional group, auditors are more cautious about issuing audit opinions in order to reduce litigation risks and reputation risk. However, the audit risk of enterprises with standard opinions is higher and the sensitivity of the information disclosure quality is higher. Influenced by customer characteristics, enterprises have incentives to improve the quality of the information disclosure. Therefore, it can be predicted that the quality of the information disclosed by enterprises with standard opinions will be more affected by the big customers with government background. Based on this, the audit opinions were grouped into groups, and the regression results are shown in Table 5. The above results verify that compared with enterprises with poor audit quality, the effect of government background big customers on improving the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure is more obvious in enterprises with good audit quality. Compared with the non-standard opinions issued, the quality of accounting information disclosure of the enterprises issued standard opinions is worse, so the greater the sensitivity to the quality of accounting information disclosure of the enterprises issued standard opinions.

Table 5: Analysis of the heterogeneity of government background customers

	<i>Edit</i>		<i>HHI</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
<i>Gov1</i>	0.054 (0.19)	-0.058** (-2.57)	-0.020 (-0.21)	-0.062*** (-2.65)
<i>Controls</i>	<i>YES</i>	<i>YES</i>	<i>YES</i>	<i>Controls</i>
<i>Year&Industry</i>	<i>YES</i>	<i>YES</i>	<i>YES</i>	<i>YES</i>
<i>R-squared</i>	0.914	0.157	0.283	0.167
<i>N</i>	61	2584	205	2440

6.2. Competitive perspective

The competition degree of product market will affect the disclosure of enterprises. Competition pressure big industry, the enterprise in the risk of instability. In order to cope with the uncertainty risk, enterprises urgently need to enhance core competitiveness, so enterprises need stable and safe supply chain relationship to bring a steady stream of cash flow. On the one hand, capital guarantee makes enterprise high quality development, on the other hand, the enterprise's good image can attract more high-quality customers, and further improve the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure obtained. However, enterprises in industries with little competitive pressure rely on a moderate industry environment, have little survival pressure, and have a weaker motivation to improve the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure. Therefore, it is predicted that in the competitive industries, government background customers have a more significant impact on corporate accounting disclosure information. Based on this, the degree of industry competition is returned in groups to explore how much the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure of competitive enterprises in different industries is affected by customers with government background. The results verify that compared with the small industry competition, the effect of government background customers in improving the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure is more obvious in enterprises with large industry competition. Based on the limited space, the chart is not shown.

7. Conclusion and enlightenment

Government background customers influence the production and operation, strategic planning, development prospects and enterprise behavior of downstream enterprises in the supply chain. The data of government background customers from 2011-2020 was manually collated, and the influence of government background customers on the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure was explored from the perspective of supply chain. The study shows that government background customers can significantly promote the quality of accounting information disclosure of suppliers; and the concentration and stability of the quality of accounting information are promoted by the government background customers. The conclusion verifies the positive effect of the policy of expanding the scale of government procurement in recent years.

Based on the conclusion of the above research, the following enlightenment are proposed: (1) Attach importance to the guidance of the identity of government background customers. Government background customers combine the role of government policies and the upstream of the supply chain on the enterprise, so the impact on the enterprise is more obvious and effective. Grasping the guiding status of government background customers is conducive to promoting the green transformation of enterprises, giving full play to the function of the government regulation mechanism, and making the national economy rise steadily; (2) The regulatory authorities should strengthen supervision, promote the improvement of the quality of enterprise accounting information disclosure, and standardize the market mechanism. The regulation of regulators affects the operation of the enterprise and the authenticity of the information disclosed to the outside world, the conclusion proves that for the purpose of purifying the market information quality regulators must further strengthen supervision, such as requiring the enterprise to report the names of the top five customers, improve the transparency of enterprise information; (3) Enterprises should strengthen the investment in supply chain management. The changes in the upstream and downstream of the supply chain will affect the operating conditions of enterprises, and strengthening the investment in supply chain management can deploy the enterprise strategy with a long-term vision and predict the market situation in advance. Pay attention to the trend of national development planning, make strategic adjustment to the business activities in line with the national economic orientation, attract more government background customers, and can further realize the sustainable development of the enterprise.

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