

Reflections on Theories of Deep Disagreement: The Same Problem and Private Viewing Difference

Feng Zhang

Beihai University of Art and Design, 536000, Beihai, Guangxi, China
2020170007@jsnu.edu.cn

Abstract: This article starts from Chris & Thirza's general summary of Theories of Deep Disagreement, critically reflects on the concept of Deep Disagreement and the concept of Disagreement, re-examines the causes of Deep Disagreement in a different way from Chris & Thirza, and explores the possible advantages of Deep Disagreement some features. This kind of questioning starts from my original concept of The Same Problem, and then discusses the Popular Opinion about Disagreement. Finally, return to Wittgenstein's Private Language Problem and Other Minds Problem, so as to lead to my original concept of Private Viewing Difference and redefine the concept of Deep Disagreement.

Keywords: Deep Disagreement, The Tame Sentence, Private Viewing Difference

1. Introduction

Wittgenstein^[1] proposed the concept of Deep Disagreement and Hinge for the first time in *On Certainty*. Based on the concepts of Deep Disagreement and Hinge, Theories of Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology are an increasingly popular trend of thought in contemporary epistemology research. Not long ago, Ranalli^[2] further improved and summarized Theories of Deep Disagreement, and critically discussed the connotation of the concept of Deep Disagreement, distinguished and classified the concept of Deep Disagreement and similar concepts, and pointed out that Deep Disagreement Disagreement has two basic characteristics: systemic and persistent. Finally, they believe that the root cause of Deep Disagreement lies in the lack of unified fundamental epistemic principles and shared background between the interlocutors. The work they have done is undoubtedly very inspiring to me, but I personally think that this discussion may not have touched the depth of Wittgenstein's related thinking in the philosophy of language, so there is no real in-depth language for the concept of Deep Disagreement Philosophical discussion. I also think that the concept of Deep Disagreement not only has two basic characteristics of system and persistence, but also some important basic characteristics are ignored by them. I also disagree with their assertion about the root cause of Deep Disagreement—the lack of unified fundamental epistemic principles and shared background between the interlocutors.

In this article, I want to re-examine the causes of Deep Disagreement in a different way from Ranalli^[2], and explore some of the possible characteristics of Deep Disagreement. This kind of questioning starts from my original concept of The Same Problem, and then discusses the Popular Opinion about Disagreement. Finally, return to Wittgenstein's Private Language Problem and Other Minds Problem, so as to lead to my original concept of Private Viewing Difference and redefine the concept of Deep Disagreement.

2. The Same Problem

In daily life, we can often find that when two interlocutors use language to communicate, it is easy to have various differences in viewpoints, and these differences have different degrees. Some differences are only due to language differences, such as a communication barrier between a person who only knows Chinese and a person who only knows English. Some differences lie in the difference in the knowledge level of two people, such as the communication barrier between a person who has studied advanced mathematics and a person who has only studied low mathematics when discussing more advanced mathematics problems. Due to the lack of controlled experiments, these discussions will draw us into the vortex of banal discussions. In order to better distinguish and analyze the concept of Deep Disagreement, we need to first distinguish and analyze the concept of Deep and Disagreement.

What exactly does the concept of Deep mean? What exactly does the concept of Disagreement mean?

Let's first discuss what Disagreement means.

E thinks "it's raining outside the room now, so it's not suitable to go out", and F thinks "it's raining outside the room now, so you should go out with an umbrella". Is the difference of opinion between E and F a disagreement? Obviously not. Because the question E cares about is "It's raining now, should I go out", while the question F cares about is "It's raining now, I'm going out, should I bring an umbrella". E and F are concerned with different issues, so there is no disagreement. This reminds us that disagreement has the first basic feature: it requires that what is faced between two or more interlocutors must be The Same Problem. Different issues clearly cannot constitute disagreement.

Suppose that the discussion between different interlocutors is The Same Problem: "Is $1+1=2$ correct?" A thinks it is correct because the mathematics knowledge he has learned told him. B thinks it is wrong because he has no knowledge of mathematics, and he guesses it is wrong based on intuition. C thinks it is wrong because he has studied mathematics and clearly remembers " $1+1=3$ ". D thinks it is wrong. Although D has learned mathematics, he found from his life that the efficiency of a group of people working together is far greater than the sum of their efficiency when they act alone, so he thinks " $1+1>2$ ". It is also true in some cases.

Is there a disagreement between A and B? Obviously not, because A and B have different knowledge backgrounds, or B has no mathematics-related knowledge background. Due to the lack of a common background between A and B, the topics of communication are not on the same channel, and the communication behavior loses the common basis of meaning and understanding. How can there be differences? There is only "gap" here rather than "divergence". Divergence means holding different positions, emotions, attitudes, and value choices for The Same Problem on the basis of common understanding. This reminds us that "divergence" and "gap" are two different concepts. "Gap" requires people to have different understanding backgrounds and different opinions when facing the same problem. The second basic feature of "divergence" is that it requires people to have the same understanding background and different opinions when facing the same problem. Views.

Is there a disagreement between A and C? Apparently not, because C has a memory error. There is only right and wrong between A and C, and there is no disagreement, and C's judgment must be wrong. It seems that A and C have the same understanding background and different opinions when facing the same problem, but the views of the two parties do not constitute differences. The reason here is that C's opinion does not pose a real challenge to A's opinion because of memory lapses. This reminds us that the third basic feature of the divergence is that there is a divergence between the opinions of A and C, if and only if A and C have the same understanding background and different opinions when facing the same problem, this kind of The difference of opinion is not due to memory lapses or poor state of one party, and the views of both parties must be "challenged" against each other in the same context.

Is there a disagreement between A and D? Obviously there is, because both have the same intellectual background, but D adopts completely different judging criteria, D produces opinions different from A, and D's standards and opinions cause some kind of alternative thinking to A's standards and opinions "challenge". Different standards are a prerequisite for posing challenges.

Let us try a new example. Suppose A and G have the same background in mathematics, and A's mathematics is very good, and G's mathematics is poor. After two people finish the same mathematics problem, A's calculation is correct, and G's calculation is wrong. Is there a divergence in the answers between A and G? Apparently not there. Because A and G have the same background and the same standard, but because G's calculation ability is not good enough, there is an error in the calculation process, and the correct answer as A is not obtained. However, a possibility has been preset here: if G's computing power is strong enough, he should have come up with the same answer as A. The interesting part is that if G was wrong in the calculation, but finally got the correct answer by mistake, how should this be understood? This involves the concept of "competence" mentioned by Sosa in his theory of virtue knowledge. Although G calculated the correct answer by accidental luck, due to G's lack of "competence", he did not get the correct answer in a skillful and appropriate manner. In short, there is only right and wrong between A and G, there is no disagreement. This reminds us that "divergence" and "error" are two different concepts. "Wrong" requires people to have the same background, the same standard and different opinions when facing the same problem. Only when the same problem is under the same background and the same standard can there be a difference between right and wrong. And "difference" is just the opposite, it requires people to have different standards under the same problem.

After the above discussion, we can use Table 1 to accurately describe the complex logical

relationship between Disagreement and Problem, Background, and Standards.

Table 1: Relationship table among background, standard and disagreement

problem	background	standard	whether there is a disagreement?
the same problem	different background	different standards	No
the same problem	different background	the same standard	No
the same problem	the same background	different standards	Yes
the same problem	the same background	the same standard	No

On the relationship between disagreement and context (is shown in Table 1). Fogelin^[3] believes that "shared background belief and preferences" is crucial to eliminate differences. Pritchard^[4] further believes that S1 and S2 have enough shared background to rationally argue about whether p only if S1 and S2 according to Hinge Epistemology have an overlapping set of hinge propositions. Matheson^[5] also believes that there should be overlapping "frames" (or "backgrounds") of disputers' disagreements. Here, I disagree with their view that the resolution of differences depends on a common background, and in the same background, differences will be resolved. I don't think differences are resolved in the same context. The difference between me and them is that I believe that only under the same background can differences be born instead of disappearing. According to Table 1, it can be seen that only when people face the same problem, the same background and different standards, Disagreement will exist.

3. Popular Opinion

After we have discussed the connotation of the concept of Disagreement in the way of The Same Problem, the next thing we need to discuss is the connotation of the concept of Deep Disagreement, but the method of exploring the connotation of the concept of Deep Disagreement is as tortuous as Wittgenstein's^[6] discussion of the Private Language Problem, because it is impossible to define directly through the method of "S is P", but can only continue to use the method of "S is not P" to try to infinitely approach the concept connotation of Deep Disagreement that I want to say. But, before we reconstruct the path of understanding Deep Disagreement, let's see what the prevailing views are.

What is the nature of deep disagreement? Ranalli^[7] believes that according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions, and the fundamental epistemic principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. These two theories undoubtedly give There are two historical generation paths of deep disagreement. The reason why deep disagreement occurs is actually related to hinge propositions and fundamental epistemic principles. Hinge propositions or fundamental epistemic principles constitute the basic part of everyone's world outlook, outlook on life, and values. According to these two theories, when different interlocutors disagree on the non-basic part, this kind of disagreement belongs to shallow disagreement. When different interlocutors disagree on the fundamentals, it is a deep disagreement.

Smith & Lynch^[8] divided deep disagreements into three categories: Principle level disagreements, Sub-principle level deep, and framework-level disagreements. Smith & Lynch pointed out that Principle level disagreements are disagreements over the truth of epistemic principles. Sub-principle level deep disagreements are disagreements over how to assign content to schematic norms. Finally, framework-level disagreements are holistic disagreements over meaning not truth, that is over how to understand networks of epistemic concepts and the beliefs those concepts compose. Within the context of each of these kinds of disagreement it is not possible for the parties to the dispute to rationally persuade one another through only offering epistemic reasons for their conflicting points of view. Ranalli^[2] also agree with Smith & Lynch's three classifications of deep divisions, and believe that Sub-principle level deep is a more inclusive deep division.

In my opinion, Smith & Lynch's three classifications of deep disagreement are logically contradictory to the two historical generation paths of disagreement given by Ranalli, because Sub-principle level deep is equivalent to the divergence of non-basic existence parts. According to Smith & Lynch's understanding, such differences are classified into the category of shallow differences. This also means that Smith & Lynch admits that there are some deep disagreements that are not fundamental. Smith & Lynch considers them to be deep disagreements because neither side can know the reason to convince the other party.

Ranalli et al.'s conceptual tracing and characterization of disagreement are not successful enough. Its advantage is that people can quickly enter the context of disagreement and easily find two barely useful "ropes". However, the disadvantages are also obvious. These two barely useful "ropes" limit our way of tracing the origin of the concept of disagreement in a powerful and authoritative way. Doing some minor repair work under the regulations of the direction, lost the opportunity to conduct "metaphysical exploration" outside the "rope".

If we unanimously admit that disagreement is related to hinge propositions, and hinge propositions are related to Wittgenstein, and at the same time admit that a philosopher's thoughts in a specific period have strict logical coherence, then we must also admit that there may be a kind of disagreement in Wittgenstein. A special philosophical status, just like Wittgenstein's^[6] research on Private Language Problem and Other Minds Problem in Philosophical investigations, is full of a metaphysical Private Viewing Difference.

4. Private Viewing Difference

According to the point of view in Section 2, the premise of Disagreement is that both interlocutors can understand The Same Problem in a common background, otherwise the difference of opinions between the two parties is not even a disagreement. It is worth mentioning that Disagreement and Difference are two relatively similar concepts. If knowledge is divided into two components, true evidence and true belief, Disagreement is more inclined to different subjective opinions about true belief, and Difference is more inclined to different objective attributes of true evidence. Regarding Difference, Heidegger^[9] described it as "difference produced in identity", thus affirming the dialectic of "I am in you and you in me" between the two concepts of "identity" and "difference" Relationships, differences arise on the same basis. Disagreement is based on a similar structure. It also requires that interlocutors cannot have completely different opinions, but must use the same background as the premise of connection, and differences arise on the basis of connection. Shallow divergences are based on shallow connections, and deep divergences are based on deep connections. Wittgenstein^[1] called this deep connection a "hinge" when he said: "The questions we ask, and our doubts, depend on the fact that certain propositions are free from doubt, just as those turns depend on the hinges The same." "Hinge" is a metaphorical concept, which symbolizes the most basic and important concepts in the background of the overall understanding on which personal choices, judgments and value orientations depend, and it provides a lasting logical support and system for all of a person's concepts Sexual Asylum. Fogelin^[3] argues that deep disagreements are systemic and persistent, just as hinge propositions are systemic and persistent.

Ranalli^[2] point out that unlike common beliefs, hinge promises lack "standard" evidence against them. The reason is that the hinge itself is the lasting logical support and systematic shelter of all one's ideas. It is equivalent to the most basic logical presupposition and the premise of rational thinking. It can only be used to explain other logical propositions, but it itself is cannot be explained by other logical propositions. Pritchard^[11] believes that Deep disagreements concern our most basic and fundamental commitments. Such disagreements seem to be problematic because they appear to manifest epistemic incommensurability in our epistemic systems, and thereby lead to epistemic relativism. Piedrahita^[12] also believes that a standard The formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism. Then, the hinge itself cannot be further defended by reason, but can only be selectively believed or disbelieved. The hinge thus becomes the "boundary" of people's rational defense and logical argument, beyond the "boundary" is a place where reason and logic cannot reach, perhaps this just responds to what Wittgenstein^[10] said, "Anything that can be said can be said clearly, and anything that cannot be said should be silence". This reminds us that in addition to being systematic and persistent, hinges also have boundaries.

In addition to systemicity, persistence, and boundaries, I believe that hinges are also private, everyday, intuitive, personal, limited, and irrational. I attribute all these latter properties to the concept of Private Viewing Difference. In my opinion, contemporary Anglo-American scholars' research on deep differences focuses on the differences in basic cognitive principles that can or cannot be resolved by rationality. However, the real deep differences lie in the part of Private Viewing Difference that can never be resolved by reason alone.

Wittgenstein^[6] proposed an anti-private language argument, arguing that each person must have a private feeling that cannot be communicated to others through language, so private language does not exist. Kripke^[13] further advances this argument into two subproblems: Rule-following Problem and

Other Minds Problem. It can be seen from Kripke's related expositions that Wittgenstein's philosophy has an idea: the metaphysical reflection on the privateness of language. What needs to be clarified here is that Wittgenstein does not believe that private feelings do not exist, but that private feelings cannot be communicated to others through language, so private language does not exist, but private feelings still exist. If we accept this argument, then we can extract the concept of "privacy" contained in the concept of "private sensation" by Wittgenstein and Kripke, and use this concept of "privacy" with metaphysical characteristics to accurately describe a concept of "deep divergence" that has real metaphysical depth. When we understand the extreme difficulty of understanding "privacy", we can also understand where the real "depth" of the concept of "deep differences" is. This "depth" must have the same extreme and individual nature as "privateness" that transcends language, reason, and logic. It belongs to each unique individual and cannot be communicated to others, nor shared or accepted.

Combined with the concept of "private feeling", we can also say that such an extreme deep disagreement is intuitive, personal, irrational and limited. I am opposed to contemporary Anglo-American scholars discussing deep-seated differences purely from a rational point of view. If a disagreement can be resolved rationally, it is not a deep-seated disagreement, let alone a disagreement. It can only be called a gap or a mistake. Let us think about some specific historical scenarios. Russell and Wittgenstein have ideological differences. As we all know, both of them are logicians and analytical philosophers, with a common philosophical school and thinking style, and a common language expression level, rational level, logical level, professional level, and theoretical choice tendency, the ideological differences between the two must not be caused by language differences, rational level differences, logical differences, professional/non-professional differences, as well as theoretical selection differences between the two. Let us think about the common phenomenon in life. There is a "generation gap" between parents and children. The interlocutors have different personalities, experiences, and emotions. Disagreements in the past cannot necessarily be resolved only through clarification at the three levels of language, logic, and rationality, and such differences have nothing to do with purely irrational beliefs. Let us imagine again that two once very good friends parted ways or were hostile to each other because of different political stances. Their choice of different political stances must not be purely out of reason, and the deep differences here cannot be resolved through reason. Finally, let us imagine a case where two different viewers read the same literary work by Shakespeare, or listen to the same piece of music by Beethoven, or watch the same painting by Van Gogh. The verbal and private art experience must have individual differences and be irrational. Through various vivid and ubiquitous cases, we can judge that an extreme deep disagreement must have nothing to do with reason, and it is "private". It can also be seen from this that both the concept of deep division and the concept of hinge are closely related to Wittgenstein's private language problem and the problem of other minds. Trächtler^[14] believes that other minds problem is HINGES OF TRUST.

There is another disadvantage of looking at deep-seated differences from a rational perspective: this kind of research perspective breaks away from the observation of daily life at the beginning, and regards deep-seated differences as things that only happen between two completely rational interlocutors. Academic activities, returning home, communicating with their parents, I believe that everyone can find the existence of the "generation gap". When talking to different friends, everyone will encounter times when they are not understood. It reveals that deep differences can not only be private and perceptual, but also exist in every person, every object, every problem, and every viewpoint in daily life. Once we try to break our differences with others, the people we communicate with are often not purely rational people, but people who are both rational and irrational. We often encounter people who refuse to communicate with us out of systematic prejudice. The interlocutor who communicates rationally. When we combine Wittgenstein's philosophical observation of "everyday language", there are endless differences in the communication of language, and finally appear as extreme metaphysical eternal differences. This ubiquitous everydayness is, besides privateness, a hallmark of extreme deep disagreement.

In the end, I think that differences come from differences in viewing, and extreme depth differences come from differences in private viewing. The latter is associated with private language problems and problems with other minds.

5. Conclusion

If we admit, not only in knowledge, but in many areas beyond knowledge, that deep disagreements are daily and pervasive, and that such disagreements are forever irreconcilable by virtue of their

absolute metaphysical privateness, should we not Understanding others with a humble attitude to get along with other interlocutors? Hazlett^[15] believes that on which humility is a matter higher-order epistemic attitudes. Pritchard^[16] pointed out from a non-conciliatory standpoint that the correct interpretation of intellectual humility is completely compatible with taking a non-conciliatory route to cognitive peer differences. The debate about these two positions leads to work we may do later.

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