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Academic Journal of Business & Management, 2023, 5(7); doi: 10.25236/AJBM.2023.050706.

Controlling Shareholders' Equity Pledge, Inside Pledge Supervision, and Merger and Acquisition Decisions

Author(s)

Li Xintao

Corresponding Author:
Li Xintao
Affiliation(s)

School of Business and Management, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai, China

Abstract

In recent years, the pledge of stock rights is increasingly favored by shareholders.In this context, this paper studies the relationship between equity pledge and mergers and acquisitions under inside pledge supervision. Using the annual data of listed companies from 2007 to 2021, we find that inside pledge can inhibit the relationship between equity pledge and mergers and acquisitions. In addition, our endogeneity test is also robust.

Keywords

Equity pledge; M&A; Inside Pledge

Cite This Paper

Li Xintao. Controlling Shareholders' Equity Pledge, Inside Pledge Supervision, and Merger and Acquisition Decisions. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2023) Vol. 5, Issue 7: 33-39. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2023.050706.

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