The hold-up problem plays an important role in the study of corporate boundaries and is also an important factor in the study of economics in organizations. It not only causes underinvestment, but also leads to the loss of corporate earnings and social welfare. The hold-up problem has been a hot topic for scholars since its introduction. However, most of the scholars' studies are based on the assumption of rational economic man and do not consider the factor of human beings' social preferences. In recent years, the development of behavioral experimental research methods has changed this situation. Many scholars have demonstrated that people's behavior deviates from the assumption of rational economic man because they have different social preferences. Therefore, this paper introduces a frontier theoretical perspective in the game study of the hold-up problem. Based on social identity theory, and speculates that group identity enhances the altruistic preference of individuals toward group members, and combines behavioral experiments with controlled laboratory experiments to obtain experimental data. The experimental results also support our speculation and provide an individual experimental basis for the theoretical study of the hold-up problem, which will help alleviate the hold-up problem in the future.

Cenlin Zhang, Rong Yu. The influence of group identity on the hold-up problem. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2023) Vol. 5, Issue 8: 137-140. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2023.050823.

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