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Academic Journal of Business & Management, 2019, 1(3); doi: 10.25236/AJBM.2019.010308.

Ultimate Control Shareholder Cash Flow Rights, Refinancing Needs and Cash Dividend Policies

Author(s)

Qin Yin

Corresponding Author:
Qin Yin
Affiliation(s)

School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 201800, China
yinqindeyouxiang@163.com

Abstract

The cash dividend policy of the listed company is the financial decision of reasonable distribution of profit between cash dividend and internal retention.It is an important index to measure the business performance and its growth.This paper starts from the governance factor of ultimate ownership structure and introduces the regulating variable of refinancing demand.On the basis of trying to form a complete research framework, through literature review, theoretical model construction and empirical test, this paper systematically and deeply discusses the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and cash dividend payment willingness and payment level. Data from shenzhen stock exchange and Shanghai stock exchange from 2007 to 2018 are used in this paper.This paper finds that the cash flow right of the ultimate controlling shareholder is positively correlated with the cash dividend policy. There is a significant negative correlation between refinancing demand and cash dividend policy, and refinancing demand can inhibit the positive correlation between ultimate controlling shareholders' cash flow right and cash dividend payment.

Keywords

Ultimate controlling shareholder cash flow rights, Refinancing needs, Cash dividend policy

Cite This Paper

Qin Yin. Ultimate Control Shareholder Cash Flow Rights, Refinancing Needs and Cash Dividend Policies. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2019) Vol. 1, Issue 3: 60-69. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2019.010308.

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