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International Journal of Frontiers in Sociology, 2023, 5(6); doi: 10.25236/IJFS.2023.050608.

Research on the Improvement Idea of the Carbon Tariff System

Author(s)

Wenhao Yang

Corresponding Author:
Wenhao Yang
Affiliation(s)

School of Law, Guangxi University, Nanning, Guangxi, China

Abstract

As the problem of the greenhouse effect becomes more serious, limiting carbon emissions has become an issue in environmental issues. The author agrees that the existing EU carbon tariff policy has a positive incentive to limit carbon emissions. However, for the global carbon emission problem, a joint boycott mechanism should also be established in order to truly make the carbon emission governance of the international community achieve Pareto optimality, that is, to achieve the optimal allocation of resources on the carbon emission issue. But the boycott mechanism is only an answer drawn from the overall efficiency of the international community, and it does not answer the question of the legitimacy of international economic law and the achievement of fair distribution. Therefore, the author interprets carbon tariffs in terms of international law and supports that the purpose of carbon tariffs is to maintain public morality and can become an exception to the principle of most-favored-nation treatment. The author also envisages several preconditions for establishing carbon tariffs to achieve the goal of fairness and to exclude individual countries from using carbon tariffs to restrict international trade in disguise.

Keywords

the carbon tariff system; the game theory; the international environmental law

Cite This Paper

Wenhao Yang. Research on the Improvement Idea of the Carbon Tariff System. International Journal of Frontiers in Sociology (2023), Vol. 5, Issue 6: 44-48. https://doi.org/10.25236/IJFS.2023.050608.

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