Investigate whether internal control has an inhibiting influence on non-efficiency investment. Is the degree of marketization of firms and the form of property rights influencing this negative effect? This research examines the influence and disparities of internal control on the non-efficient investment of organizations with varying property rights and degrees of marketization using panel data from 2,133 Chinese listed A-share companies from 2015 to 2020. Based on existing research, this paper introduces the marketization process and the nature of property rights, which provides a new perspective for the study of the influence of internal control on the investment efficiency of enterprises. The study of this paper also hopes to provide reference for government regulatory authorities.

Jialei Liu, Qingxuan Yu. Internal control, marketization process and enterprise non-efficiency investment-analysis based on property rights heterogeneity. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2023) Vol. 5, Issue 14: 132-141. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2023.051422.

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