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Academic Journal of Business & Management, 2023, 5(17); doi: 10.25236/AJBM.2023.051701.

Which has stronger incentives for performance - equity or compensation

Author(s)

Zhenwei Liu

Corresponding Author:
Zhenwei Liu
Affiliation(s)

School of Economics and Management, Guangxi Normal University, Guilin, China

Abstract

The modern separation of ownership and control in listed companies has given rise to principal-agent problems, and providing incentives to senior management within the company has become one of the important means to address these issues. This study empirically examines the relationship between equity incentives, compensation incentives, and corporate performance using data from Chinese A-share listed companies during the period from 2015 to 2019. The research findings indicate that executive equity incentives contribute to improving company performance, showing a significant positive correlation. Similarly, executive compensation incentives also exhibit a significant positive impact on corporate performance. Additionally, the incentivizing effect of executive equity incentives on company performance is more pronounced compared to compensation incentives.

Keywords

Equity incentives; Compensation incentives; Corporate performance

Cite This Paper

Zhenwei Liu. Which has stronger incentives for performance - equity or compensation. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2023) Vol. 5, Issue 17: 1-6. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2023.051701.

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