Academic Journal of Business & Management, 2023, 5(22); doi: 10.25236/AJBM.2023.052214.
Beibei Jiang1, Luyao Wang2
1Ginling College, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, 210023, China
2School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Weihai, 100044, China
As the most direct indicator of the performance of the company's operating results in a certain period of time, surplus transparency can solve the problem of information asymmetry, help to improve enterprise performance and promote enterprise technological innovation. Exit threat as a concept in social psychology has begun to be introduced into the field of corporate governance in recent years. As an effective way of equity governance, the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders plays an increasingly significant role in corporate governance. We demonstrate that the exit of non-controlling major shareholders can enhance the transparency of earnings by examining a sample of 20,415 observation values of Chinese A-share listed enterprises from 2001 to 2020, and propose certain targeted suggestions which have a significant effect on the betterment of information disclosure systems and corporate governance.
Exit Threat, Non-controlling Major Shareholder, Quality of Accounting Information Disclosure, Surplus Transparency
Beibei Jiang, Luyao Wang. The Impact of the Exit Threat of Non-controlling Major Shareholders on Surplus Transparency—Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2023) Vol. 5, Issue 22: 98-104. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2023.052214.
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