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Academic Journal of Business & Management, 2023, 5(23); doi: 10.25236/AJBM.2023.052315.

Credit Risk Prevention of Local Government Financing Platforms: Taking Liuzhou TK Company as an Example

Author(s)

Lu Qiuyan

Corresponding Author:
Lu Qiuyan
Affiliation(s)

School of Economics and Management, Guangxi Normal University, Guilin, China

Abstract

At the beginning of its establishment, the purpose of local government financing platform companies was to undertake some political functions for the local government, with the goal of promoting local economic development. However, with the continuous development of the local economy, the expanding debt scale of local government financing platform companies has led to a sharp increase in credit risk. Events such as the 20-year extension of Zunyi 15.6 billion urban investment bonds and the technical default of Lanzhou Urban Investment have successively occurred, and investors' "urban investment faith" has begun to waver, studying the credit risk of local government financing platforms is of great significance. This article takes Liuzhou TK Company as an example and establishes a KMV model based on the dual attributes of the company's local government financing platform and industry non-listed companies to quantitatively evaluate the company's credit risk. Finally, based on this case, this article draws universal conclusions and proposes targeted suggestions from multiple perspectives.

Keywords

Local government; Financing platform; Credit risk; KMV model

Cite This Paper

Lu Qiuyan. Credit Risk Prevention of Local Government Financing Platforms: Taking Liuzhou TK Company as an Example. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2023) Vol. 5, Issue 23: 98-105. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2023.052315.

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