Academic Journal of Business & Management, 2023, 5(23); doi: 10.25236/AJBM.2023.052324.
Yanyan Li1, Hong Liu1, Yan Ji2
1School of Business Administration, University of Science and Technology Liaoning, Anshan City, 114051, China
2University of Science and Technology Liaoning, Anshan City, 114051, China
Carbon dioxide produced by human production activities has led to an increase in global temperatures, thus triggering a series of climate disasters. In order to solve the frequent environmental problems, countries around the world have taken corresponding measures. This paper takes the iron and steel industry under the carbon emission constraint and carbon trading market mechanism as the research object, and analyzes the strategic choice problems of the government, manufacturers and retailers in the process of low-carbon emission reduction under the carbon constraint. An evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the stability of the strategic choices of the government, manufacturers and retailers. It is found that, except for the equilibrium point (0,0,0), the rest of the equilibrium points can become stable equilibrium point ESS under different conditions, and the three parties interact with each other.
carbon trading mechanism, low carbon, evolutionary game, steel industry, ESS
Yanyan Li, Hong Liu, Yan Ji. A Study on the Strategic Stability of Government and Steel Enterprises under Carbon Trading Mechanisms. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2023) Vol. 5, Issue 23: 167-174. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2023.052324.
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