Currently, there is a certain shift in the management mode of enterprises in China, and at the same time, higher standards are put forward for corporate governance. Taking 2012-2021 GEM listed companies as a sample, the impact of executive shareholding on corporate governance efficiency is examined from the dynamic level of enterprise life cycle. The empirical results show that executive shareholding has a positive impact on corporate governance efficiency, and there are differences in the impact of executive shareholding on corporate governance efficiency when enterprises are in different life cycles. From the expansive analysis, it can be seen that female executive shareholding has an inverted "U"-shaped relationship with corporate governance efficiency, and this effect only exists in the growth period of the enterprise's life cycle. This paper enriches the research on executive shareholding and corporate governance efficiency, and provides theoretical references for the implementation of executive shareholding plans in GEM companies.

Yanchao Pan. The Impact of Executive Shareholding on Corporate Governance Efficiency—from Firm Life Cycle Perspective. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2023) Vol. 5, Issue 23: 204-211. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2023.052328.

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