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International Journal of New Developments in Engineering and Society, 2020, 4(1); doi: 10.25236/IJNDES.040101.

Management Overconfidence, Non-Executive Directors and Audit Fees


Ting Tan

Corresponding Author:
Ting Tan

School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 201800, China
[email protected]


Based on the behavioral finance theory and principal-agent theory, this paper adopts a combination of normative research and empirical research,this paper empirically tests the impact of managers' overconfidence on audit fees, and analyzes the mechanism of the relationship between non-executive directors and audit fees.This paper selects the data of A-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2018 as the research object,the empirical results show that the management with overconfidence reduces the quality of accounting information and increases the risk of the company,In order to avoid the possible audit risk, auditors increase the audit workload and increase the risk premium, thus increasing the audit cost.Further research shows that the non-executive directors can supervise the management to a certain extent. With the increase of the proportion of non-executive directors, the positive correlation between managers' overconfidence and audit costs gradually weakens.


audit fees, overconfidence of managers, non-executive directors

Cite This Paper

Ting Tan. Management Overconfidence, Non-Executive Directors and Audit Fees. International Journal of New Developments in Engineering and Society (2020) Vol.4, Issue 1: 1-10. https://doi.org/10.25236/IJNDES.040101.


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