As a new financing way, equity pledge has gradually become the important way of financing. Relying on a large number of advantages in convenience, efficiency and lower cost, the scale of impawn financing is increasing, which has resulted in a series of risks that can not be ignored. The controlling shareholder as the business owner had a great influence on the company. A good example is company's share. So based on the research of controlling shareholder equity pledge, the aim of this article is to find out the impact on share price. Through the research of the controlling shareholder equity pledge, to found the impact of pledge risks on share price. Through impact mechanism's analysis, the phenomenon of asymmetric information market can be observed, and holding shareholders will take advantage of it to encroach on the benefits of minority shareholders and to damage the interests of the company. This situation will lead to escaping of small and medium-sized shareholders because of panic, resulting in the stock price's volatility. Based on researching equity pledge of the relationship between investor sentiment and stock price, this essay will analyse that investors have a mediation effect on the share price.

Jintao Liu. Research on the Influence Mechanism of Stock Pledge of Controlling Shareholders on Stock Price Fluctuation. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2020) Vol. 2, Issue 1: 36-43. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2020.020105.

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