This paper has highlighted an individualistic element that often underlies corruption: sometimes, managers of military companies violate laws and regulations to pursue personal interests, resulting in vast losses for state coffers. This aspect is especially applicable in the case of Hudong Zhonghua, particularly regarding the relationships between the managers of military state enterprises and their relatives and the avenues of corruption involving the acquisition of real estate. Overall, the case study reveal serious imperfections in official control mechanisms of industrial activity, whose fine-tuning is even more desirable for Chinese leadership today in light of the government's strategy to strengthen the fight against corruption.

Yi Yang. A study on corruption in China's military enterprises after the 18th national congress of the CPC. International Journal of Frontiers in Sociology (2020), Vol. 2, Issue 1: 10-18. https://doi.org/10.25236/IJFS.2020.020102.

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