The full rollout of the registration‑based initial public offering (IPO) system has advanced the market‑oriented transformation of China’s capital market, while imposing stricter requirements on the corporate governance quality and financial risk management capabilities of listed enterprises. Centered on information disclosure as its core regulatory principle, the registration‑based system has amplified the negative spillover effects of corporate governance defects on the market, making financial risk prevention and control a core concern for both enterprises and regulators. Drawing on principal‑agent theory and information asymmetry theory, this paper constructs an analytical framework illustrating how corporate governance shapes financial risk. Taking China Huarong Asset Management Co., Ltd. as a typical case, it systematically explores the internal and external drivers of financial risk outbreaks among financial enterprises within the registration‑based IPO context. The findings reveal that internal governance failures — including dysfunctional board oversight, unchecked management power, and ineffective internal controls — constitute the root causes of risk accumulation. Aggressive expansion strategies and distorted business philosophies further accelerate risk materialization. Externally, the inherent high‑risk nature of the asset management industry and an increasingly stringent regulatory environment jointly serve as major external triggers for risk outbreaks. On this basis, this paper proposes targeted governance countermeasures from enterprise‑level and regulatory perspectives, offering practical references for improving the governance quality of listed firms and preventing systemic financial risks under the registration‑based IPO system.

Wu Qiqi. Corporate Governance Deficiencies and Financial Risk Outbreaks under the Registration-Based IPO System: A Case Study of China Huarong Asset Management Co., Ltd. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2026), Vol. 8, Issue 9: 86-91. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2026.080910.

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