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International Journal of Frontiers in Sociology, 2026, 8(4); doi: 10.25236/IJFS.2026.080402.

Federalism-Based Regulatory Coherence Mapping: A Computational Framework for Comparing Statutory Definitions of Political Misinformation in Canada and Australia

Author(s)

Zijian Liao

Corresponding Author:
Zijian Liao
Affiliation(s)

University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada

Abstract

We propose a computational framework, Federalism-Based Regulatory Coherence Mapping (FBRCM), to analyze how federal structures in Canada and Australia produce fragmented statutory definitions of political misinformation. The central impetus is that existing comparative legal methods treat each statute in isolation, thereby overlooking systematic definitional divergences arising from uncoordinated institutional layering across federal and subnational jurisdictions. Our methodology integrates three novel components. The Constitutionalization Spectrum Index assesses each statutory definition’s location along a continuum that ranges from purely central to jointly central-subnational governance, with weights determined by the frequency of litigation across constitutional dimensions. Second, a Doctrinal-Siloing Decomposition module, which is an appositive component, conducts cross-instrument term migration analysis via a bipartite graph, wherein edge weights denote semantic drift scores computed from legal-domain BERT embeddings; a high drift score indicates that a term’s meaning has shifted markedly from its canonical usage. Third, a component termed Adaptive Regulatory-Coherence Mapping identifies critical coherence gaps by means of a constrained optimization procedure, after which it categorizes each gap as structural, philosophical, or empirical via a gradient-boosted decision tree. The framework’s primary contribution is a quantitative, actionable typology of regulatory-coherence problems, ranked by a coherence potential score. For instance, structural gaps imply particular intergovernmental coordination mechanisms, whereas philosophical gaps direct comparative legal analysis toward the most critical definitional differences. We show that this method replaces conventional qualitative tables with a quantitative prior, thereby directing legal scrutiny toward the top twenty percent of coherence gaps. The importance consists in supplying a systematic, data-driven approach for comparing federal misinformation regimes, thus permitting targeted regulatory reform that respects constitutional diversity while reducing definitional fragmentation.

Keywords

Federalism, Political Misinformation, Regulatory Coherence, Digital Platforms, Canada, Australia, Semantic Drift, Computational Legal Analysis

Cite This Paper

Zijian Liao. Federalism-Based Regulatory Coherence Mapping: A Computational Framework for Comparing Statutory Definitions of Political Misinformation in Canada and Australia. International Journal of Frontiers in Sociology (2026), Vol. 8, Issue 4: 8-19. https://doi.org/10.25236/IJFS.2026.080402.

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