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International Journal of Frontiers in Sociology, 2021, 3(1); doi: 10.25236/IJFS.2021.030103.

Shareholding Structure, Board Governance, and Corporate Performance

Author(s)

Jianwei Ma and Yunqing Gao*

Corresponding Author:
Yunqing Gao
Affiliation(s)

School of Economics and Management, Lanzhou University of Technology, Lanzhou 730000, China

Abstract

With the comprehensive deepening of the reform of mixed ownership, does the shareholding structure of state-owned enterprises affect its performance? How does it affect? To this end, this article selects the data of A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018 to explore the interrelationships between shareholding structure, board governance and corporate performance. The results show that: (1) equity concentration and equity balance have a positive impact on corporate performance; (2) equity concentration and equity balance have a positive impact on board governance; (3) between shareholding structure and corporate performance Board governance plays a clear mediating role.

Keywords

State-Owned Enterprises; Shareholding Structure; Board Governance; Corporate Performance

Cite This Paper

Jianwei Ma and Yunqing Gao. Shareholding Structure, Board Governance, and Corporate Performance. International Journal of Frontiers in Sociology (2021), Vol. 3, Issue 1: 18-29. https://doi.org/10.25236/IJFS.2021.030103.

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