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International Journal of Frontiers in Sociology, 2021, 3(12); doi: 10.25236/IJFS.2021.031203.

Research on the Relationship between the Ownership Structure and Business Performance of Listed Companies

Author(s)

Jiahan Song 

Corresponding Author:
Jiahan Song
Affiliation(s)

Shanghai University, Shanghai, 200444, China

Abstract

A sound corporate governance structure is conducive to avoiding the company’s business risks and improving the company’s operating performance. This article uses a fixed effects model for research. The data comes from 623 non-financial listed companies in the A-share markets. The time span is 2012-2020. The results show that the concentrated and the balanced ownership structure has obviously positive correlation with business performance. When the major shareholders own most of the company’s shares, they will have greater interest and enthusiasm for the management of the company, which will constrain the behavior of managers, and improve corporate performance. Concentration of equity has a more significant positive impact on non-state-owned enterprises than on state-owned enterprises. When other major shareholders can restrain the largest shareholder, they can significantly restrict the “interest encroachment” behavior of large shareholders, which is beneficial to the sustainable operation of the company. In addition, the positive correlation is particularly significant in the eastern region.

Keywords

Ownership Concentration, Equity Balance Degree, Business Performance

Cite This Paper

Jiahan Song. Research on the Relationship between the Ownership Structure and Business Performance of Listed Companies. International Journal of Frontiers in Sociology (2021), Vol. 3, Issue 12: 14-20. https://doi.org/10.25236/IJFS.2021.031203.

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