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The Frontiers of Society, Science and Technology, 2022, 4(2); doi: 10.25236/FSST.2022.040208.

Vicious Competition Trap of Tournament Incentive and Its Correction


Wang Zongyu, Fan Qiming, Yuan Xuefeng

Corresponding Author:
Wang Zongyu

School of Economics, Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing, 101149, China


Tournament theory is widely used in the promotion field because of its advantages such as high incentive intensity. However, the theory inevitably has many defects, one of them is that the promotion game participants fall into the vicious competition trap. The theoretical model of this paper shows that under the tournament promotion mechanism, the design of promotion rules is very important to the performance of enterprises. To avoid vicious competition between employees for promotion, this paper believes that enterprise managers can consider adding some indicators related to the overall interests of the enterprise organization when formulating the promotion rules of employees.


Promotion Game, Tournament theory, Prisoner’s dilemma, Incentive effect

Cite This Paper

Wang Zongyu, Fan Qiming, Yuan Xuefeng. Vicious Competition Trap of Tournament Incentive and Its Correction. The Frontiers of Society, Science and Technology (2022) Vol. 4, Issue 2: 37-44. https://doi.org/10.25236/FSST.2022.040208.


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