Academic Journal of Business & Management, 2022, 4(14); doi: 10.25236/AJBM.2022.041417.
Chen Xu
Jiangxi Normal University, Nanchang, China
This paper focuses on the exogenous policy of changing sewage fees to taxes in 2018, studies the impact of increasing sewage fees on corporate tax avoidance, and explores its mechanism from the perspective of enterprise production efficiency. The results show that the change of sewage discharge fee to tax will promote corporate tax avoidance and aggravate the "throttling" of corporate tax avoidance by reducing enterprise production efficiency. The research results have important implications for the Chinese government to rationally adjust environmental control standards and formulate environment-friendly investment attraction.
sewage fee; environmental protection tax; corporate tax avoidance
Chen Xu. The Impact of the Increase of Pollutant Discharge Fee on Tax Avoidance of Enterprises——Quasi Natural Experiment Based on Environmental Protection Tax. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2022) Vol. 4, Issue 14: 106-111. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2022.041417.
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