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Academic Journal of Business & Management, 2022, 4(15); doi: 10.25236/AJBM.2022.041505.

Anti-corruption, Rent-seeking and Business Performance—Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

Author(s)

Xie Yixin, Li Jian

Corresponding Author:
Xie Yixin
Affiliation(s)

School of Business, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, China

Abstract

Taking the exogenous events of the anti-corruption campaign carried out at the end of 2012 as an opportunity, this paper focuses on the influence of the anti-corruption governance work of the 18th National Congress on the economic consequences of rent-seeking enterprises, and makes an empirical test based on the A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017. This paper finds that :(1) there is a significant positive correlation between rent-seeking and firm performance; (2) Further research on the influence path shows that rent-seeking behavior can improve the manipulative performance of the firm, but has no effect on the true performance; (3) Anti-corruption will weaken the positive relationship between rent-seeking and business performance; (4) Anti-corruption will crowd out the influence of rent-seeking on manipulation performance, but will not crowd out the true performance of enterprises, and can promote the true performance of enterprises. This study shows that anti-corruption is an important external governance factor, which will restrain non-productive behaviors of enterprises and promote the development of enterprises.

Keywords

anti-corruption; rent-seeking; business performance; true performance; manipulation performance

Cite This Paper

Xie Yixin, Li Jian. Anti-corruption, Rent-seeking and Business Performance—Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2022) Vol. 4, Issue 15: 26-33. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2022.041505.

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