In family businesses between generations later, the second generation to become a member of the senior management team, embedded within the senior management team, the common interests, the second generation of decision-making behavior inevitably affect other stakeholders, in turn, the second generation will be influenced by other stakeholders, so what executives in family firms are more likely to affect the second generation of decision-making behavior? Given China's traditional culture of elders, the oldest and longest-tenured executives are naturally mentioned. Therefore, this paper explores the influence of the age difference and tenure difference of the second-generation senior executive elders on the inefficiency investment of family enterprises after inheritance, and verifies the moderating role of the chairman of the second-generation.

Yangyang Si, Jiong Wu. The influence of senior management elders and the second generation of family firms on inefficient investment. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2022) Vol. 4, Issue 15: 75-84. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2022.041513.

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