Rural tourism is an important starting point for industry to promote rural revitalization. After analyzing the risks that may be faced in the process of rural tourism construction projects, this paper introduces the dynamic game theory to establish a decision-making model for the optimal sharing ratio of shared risks in rural tourism PPP projects, and obtains the optimal Nash equilibrium solution of the model to determine the optimal ratio of risk sharing between the government and the tourism project contractor. The results show that in the dynamic game of risk sharing of rural tourism PPP projects with priority bidding by the government, the degree of information asymmetry, the loss coefficient of negotiation and the unequal status of the two parties will directly affect the optimal sharing ratio of risk sharing. Therefore, in the process of rural tourism construction, the government should publicize more information, and choose local enterprises. Construction enterprises also need to understand the relevant situation of the project from various aspects, so as to reduce information asymmetry.

Luyan Zhao. Game Research on Risk Sharing of Rural Tourism Construction Projects. International Journal of Frontiers in Sociology (2022), Vol. 4, Issue 13: 108-113. https://doi.org/10.25236/IJFS.2022.041316.

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