The question of whether vertical interlocks of executives help to strengthen the supervision of listed companies by major shareholders or facilitates the capture of interests of minority shareholders by major shareholders has aroused concern in both theoretical and practical circles. Based on the date of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed firms in China from 2009 to 2021, this paper examines the impact of vertical interlocks of executives on the enterprise innovation from the perspectives of "tunneling effect". The study finds that vertical executives reduce the enterprise innovation. The paper also finds that the vertical interlocks of executives play a "tunneling effect" through hollowing out by major shareholders.

Shuang Li. Research on the Impact of Vertical Interlocks of Executives on Enterprise Innovation. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2023) Vol. 5, Issue 2: 144-152. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2023.050221.

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