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Academic Journal of Business & Management, 2023, 5(4); doi: 10.25236/AJBM.2023.050417.

Common Institutional Ownership and Corporate Cash Holdings


Lei Li

Corresponding Author:
Lei Li

School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai, China


Based on the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020, this paper studies the impact of common institutional ownership on corporate cash holdings. The results show that common institutional ownership can significantly reduce the level of corporate cash holdings. Further analysis shows that the corporate internal governance mechanism will regulate the relationship between common institutional ownership and corporate cash holdings. In the enterprises without executive equity incentive, common institutional ownership will have a stronger inhibitory effect on corporate cash holdings.


common institutional ownership; corporate cash holdings; executive equity incentive

Cite This Paper

Lei Li. Common Institutional Ownership and Corporate Cash Holdings. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2023) Vol. 5, Issue 4: 103-112. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2023.050417.


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