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Academic Journal of Business & Management, 2023, 5(6); doi: 10.25236/AJBM.2023.050609.

Non-Financial Information Disclosure and High-Tech Executives' Insider Trading


Dongxiao Wu, Yan Zhuang

Corresponding Author:
Yan Zhuang

Management School, Beijing Union University, Beijing, China


This study investigates the relationship between non-financial information disclosed in annual reports and the probability of high-tech executives' insider trading by analyzing the readability of annual reports of high-tech companies listed on A-share markets from 2007 to 2021. The study finds that the lower the readability of the annual report, the higher the likelihood of insider trading by high-tech executives. This suggests that executives may manipulate annual reports to "conceal the obvious." Further research indicates that transparency in financial information, private ownership, and institutional investor holdings can restrain executives' opportunistic motives. This study offers insight for improving existing market supervision mechanisms for high-tech companies.


High-tech Companies, Insider Trading, Annual Report Readability, Agency Problem

Cite This Paper

Dongxiao Wu, Yan Zhuang. Non-Financial Information Disclosure and High-Tech Executives' Insider Trading. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2023) Vol. 5, Issue 6: 57-62. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2023.050609.


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