It is possible, in many purchase settings that a buyer can split a production award between suppliers. In this paper, I tried to introduce a split-award auction model with endogenous split choice. Then I discussed the equilibrium outcome of this model. By analyzing the properties of the equilibria and comparing the equilibria with a sole-source outcome, I arrived at the conclusions showing that the buyer would prefer a split-award auction to a winner-take-all auction because of the efficiency that a split-award auction can offer.

Zeyu Zhang. Simple Analysis of Split Award Auctions. The Frontiers of Society, Science and Technology (2019) Vol. 1 Issue 8: 125-131. https://doi.org/10.25236/FSST.2019.010820.

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