To address the efficiency bottlenecks in the in-plant logistics of manufacturing enterprises and multi-stakeholder interest conflicts in the promotion of drop-and-pull transport, and to fill the research gaps where existing studies prioritize technical optimization while neglecting strategic interactions among stakeholders and lack rigorous quantification of efficiency losses, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model consisting of truck drivers, loading and unloading teams, and enterprise managers, with the inbound logistics of auto parts as the research scenario. We introduce the operational blockage loss cost to replace the traditional subjective proportional coefficient, so as to quantify the economic losses caused by stakeholders' passive cooperation. The replicator dynamic equation is adopted to solve the system equilibrium points, the Jacobian matrix is applied to identify evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), and numerical simulation is performed to verify the influence mechanism of key parameters. The results demonstrate that the intensity of enterprise incentives and penalties, the distribution ratio of collaborative benefits, and post-specific blockage losses are core factors shaping the evolution trajectory of the system. The system can converge to the ideal state of tripartite collaboration when enterprises establish a sound incentive and constraint mechanism, control post-specific blockage losses, and optimize the benefit distribution scheme. The interest coordination mechanism proposed in this study provides theoretical support and practical reference for manufacturing enterprises to implement in-plant drop-and-pull transport and achieve logistics cost reduction and efficiency improvement.

Yanzhe Du. A Study on the Evolutionary Game of In-Plant Transportation Modes from the Perspective of Benefit Synergy. Academic Journal of Business & Management (2026), Vol. 8, Issue 9: 7-16. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJBM.2026.080902.

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