The COVID-19 pandemic clearly constitutes a matter of public health, and so the prospect of using a compulsory pharmaceutical licensing system in China has received renewed attention in the past year and a half. The compulsory licensing system affecting pharmaceutical patents is regarded as a mechanism for improving public access to health resources. This research considers this practice as conducted in India to evaluate whether the practice can be used to balance pharmaceutical innovation and the public interest in China. The findings of existing studies are that this system performs well with respect to addressing health equality in India, but also that it appears to be of practically unpromising with respect to being implemented within China. This research presents the results of a systematic review and a case study format to investigate the importance of adopting appropriate methods to consider issues relating to China’s non-implementation of this practice. This study also considers the extent to which positive changes can be attributed to balancing the interest of different groups within the Chinese system, this mechanism having emerged over an extended period and been drawn upon in relation to relatively few pharmaceutical applications. More studies are therefore required as a means of investigating its application in light of recent developments within public health.

Fan Yang. Balancing Pharmaceutical Innovation and the Chinese Public Interest: A Comparative Research of Compulsory Pharmaceutical Licensing Systems. Academic Journal of Humanities & Social Sciences (2023) Vol. 6, Issue 16: 47-60. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJHSS.2023.061608.

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