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Academic Journal of Humanities & Social Sciences, 2020, 3(1); doi: 10.25236/AJHSS.2020.030105.

The Research on the Influence of the Powerful Executives Serve as the Board Secretary on Earnings Management


Xiaoyu Zheng

Corresponding Author:
Xiaoyu Zheng

School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 201800, China


Because of information asymmetry, capital market creates conditions for enterprise managers to carry out earnings management. How to alleviate the problem of information asymmetry so as to restrain the earnings management behavior is always a problem to be solved. On the basis of contract theory, principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, this paper adopts combination of normative research and empirical research to select China's listed non-financial A-share companies in shanghai and shenzhen stock exchange from 2013 to 2018 as samples to empirically test the influence of part-time secretary to earnings management, and in the case of the powerful executive concurrently serving as the secretary of the board, managerial ownership can inhibit accrual earnings management, but it also has no significant effect on real earnings management.


Earnings management, Board secretary, Equity incentive

Cite This Paper

Xiaoyu Zheng. The Research on the Influence of the Powerful Executives Serve as the Board Secretary on Earnings Management. Academic Journal of Humanities & Social Sciences (2020) Vol. 3, Issue 1: 39-48. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJHSS.2020.030105.


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