With the rapid development of the digital economy, digital platforms display distinctive features such as multilateral markets, network effects and data-driven, which have reshaped the market structure in the field of digital intellectual property rights. This change has also brought about challenges such as the difficulty of defining and regulating intellectual property antitrust, especially as some platform enterprises holding a large number of intellectual property rights have utilized their own advantages to seek monopoly benefits, exacerbating the unfairness of market competition. New Structuralism believes that antitrust law should not be limited to considerations of consumer welfare, but should pay more attention to pluralistic values, competitive structure and competitive process, and build a system of checks and balances in the commercial and economic fields. Structural factors such as the size of the enterprise, the number of business users and end-users, and market barriers should be taken into account when judging IPR abuses. In addition, in order to more effectively conduct antitrust regulation of IPR abuses in the era of the digital economy, the special challenges of the digital economy can be addressed through measures such as strengthening the interface between ex ante and antitrust regulation of platforms.

Zhenqin Wu, Qiju Wang, Ziyan Lin. A Study on the Definition and Antitrust Regulation of Intellectual Property Abuse in the Age of Digital Economy: A Structuralist Perspective. Academic Journal of Humanities & Social Sciences (2024) Vol. 7, Issue 12: 79-84. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJHSS.2024.071213.

[1] Wang Mingze. Analysis of Monopoly in Digital Economy from Structuralist Perspective[J]. China Science and Technology Forum, 2023,(03):129-139.

[2] KHAN L. The new brandeis movement america's antimonopoly debate [J].Journal of European competition law & practice, 2018,9(3) :131.

[3] Tang Yaojia, Wang Yu. Reconstruction of antitrust consumer welfare standards in the digital economy [J]. Journal of Humanities,2022,(08):46-56.

[4] Yu Li. Watchdog system in digital market antitrust perspective[J]. Finance and Accounting Monthly, 2022,(09):152-160.

[5] Wang Zhonghong. Comparison of Harvard School and Chicago School Competition Theories and Their Implications for China's Antitrust[J]. Economic Review,2003,(01):72-74.

[6] Guo Chuankai. Antitrust Regulation Path of Blocking Behavior of Internet Platform Enterprises[J]. Law Forum, 2021,36(04):81-89.

[7] Lv Mingyu. On Monopoly Control in Intellectual Property Licensing[J]. Law Review, 2009, 27(06): 15-24.

[8] Yin Jiguo. Antitrust Regulation of Copyright Abuse Behavior of Long Video Platforms[J]. Politics and Law,2023,(02):160-176.

[9] Liu Xiaochun. Antitrust Law Positioning and Regulation of Digital Platform Ecosystem[J]. Thought Front, 2022,48(01):138-148.

[10] Lu Daifu, LI Xiaowen. Research on Antitrust Regulation of Mega Platform Mergers and Acquisitions of Startups[J]. Journal of Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications (Social Science Edition),2023,35(04):51-64.

[11] Li Xiliang. Antitrust Regulation and Ex-ante Regulation: A Dualistic Construction of the Regulatory Model of Internet Platforms[J]. Jiao Tong University Law,2023,(02):89-103.

[12] Tao Yinqiu, Zhang Kaiyi. The Dilemma and Improvement of the Centralized Review System of Operators in the Background of Digital Economy[J]. Industrial Economics Review, 2023,(01):136-148.