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Academic Journal of Engineering and Technology Science, 2020, 3(8); doi: 10.25236/AJETS.2020.030806.

Local government debt and corporate tax burden

Author(s)

Xinli Chen

Corresponding Author:
Xinli Chen
Affiliation(s)

Shanghai University, School of management, Shanghai

Abstract

After the implementation of the new budget law in 2015, China's local government bond market was officially established and gradually developed, and the scale of bonds was gradually expanded, especially the scale of special bonds: from 100 billion in 2015 to 2150 billion in 2019, the issuance scale of new special bonds increased rapidly in five years. Under the background of the continuous expansion of bond scale, the research object of local government debt gradually changes from urban investment bonds to government bonds. This paper aims to study the path between the size of local government bonds and corporate tax burden.

Keywords

General government bonds, special government bonds, corporate tax burden

Cite This Paper

Xinli Chen. Local government debt and corporate tax burden. Academic Journal of Engineering and Technology Science (2020) Vol. 3 Issue 8: 49-60. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJETS.2020.030806.

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