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Academic Journal of Engineering and Technology Science, 2021, 4(2); doi: 10.25236/AJETS.2021.040205.

Study on the Impact of Mixed Ownership Reform on the Performance of State-owned Enterprises


Shan Zhu1, *

Corresponding Author:
Shan Zhu

1School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China

*Corresponding author


Based on 2013-2019 state-owned listed companies as samples, and from the aspects of ownership structure and top management, examine the influence of mixed ownership reform of state-owned listed companies performance, the results showed that the mixed ownership significantly promoted the reform of state-owned enterprise performance, and non-state-owned capital by appointed director of the senior management mode to promote the performance of state-owned enterprises effect is more obvious than ownership; In addition, it is also found that compared with SOEs with stronger government intervention, the improvement effect of mixed-ownership reform on SOEs' performance is more significant in SOEs with weaker government intervention.


mixed ownership reform, performance of state-owned enterprises, government intervention

Cite This Paper

Shan Zhu. Study on the Impact of Mixed Ownership Reform on the Performance of State-owned Enterprises. Academic Journal of Engineering and Technology Science (2021) Vol. 4, Issue 2: 34-37. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJETS.2021.040205.


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