Academic Journal of Humanities & Social Sciences, 2023, 6(3); doi: 10.25236/AJHSS.2023.060308.
Zechen Zhang
Juris Doctor, Law Faculty, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
In the early twentieth century, an American jurist, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, proposed an analytical scheme of jural relations. He put forward four pairs of basic legal elements to justify the nature of the entire legal relations in reality, which however incurs a large number of criticisms from various perspectives in academic literatures. This essay will analyse and respond certain main criticisms on the basis of appropriate interpretation of Hohfeld’s framework and explore one of primary flaws of his theory.
Hohfeld; analytical platform; criticism; response; failure of guiding
Zechen Zhang. Explaining or Guiding Legal System: Hohfeld’s Approach of Rights. Academic Journal of Humanities & Social Sciences (2023) Vol. 6, Issue 3: 44-48. https://doi.org/10.25236/AJHSS.2023.060308.
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